Reward, risk and response in Australian cooperative research centres

Abstract

Cooperative research centres are a well-established organizational embodiment of the 'triple helix' . As complex inter-organizational structures they are subject to diverse management strategies. The imperatives that drive their strategic plans and their impact on partner organizations and the careers of the scientists who work within them are not well understood. We examine 370 participants' experience in Australian Cooperative Research Centres and consider their effect on personnel and organizations in the public research system. We propose that a necessary part of management strategies is the negotiation and reconciliation of risk and reward for partner organizations and careers of participating scientists. Achieving a sustainable strategy carries implications for change within the partner organizations and for the endurance of CRCs as organizational arrangements. These emergent triple helix structures can be harbingers of change not just for the alternative institutional structures they present and the partner organizations, but also for the careers of scientists. Abstract: Cooperative research centres are a well-established organizational embodiment of the 'triple helix'. As complex inter-organizational structures they are subject to diverse management strategies. The imperatives that drive their strategic plans and their impact on partner organizations and the careers of the scientists who work within them are not well understood. We examine 370 participants' experience in Australian Cooperative Research Centres and consider their effect on personnel and organizations in the public research system. We propose that a necessary part of management strategies is the negotiation and reconciliation of risk and reward for partner organizations and careers of participating scientists. Achieving a sustainable strategy carries implications for change within the partner organizations and for the endurance of CRCs as organizational arrangements. These emergent triple helix structures can be harbingers of change not just for the alternative institutional structures they present and the partner organizations, but also for the careers of scientists.

Individual motivation and threat indicators of collaboration readiness in scientific knowledge producing teams: a scoping review and domain analysis

“…However, few studies have cited administrative support acquisition as a reason to collaborate. In the case of international research centers, study participants have found management structures in these centers to be administratively burdensome ( Turpin and Garrett-Jones, 2010 ). Collaboration between individuals and institutions creates more administrative and management needs, which may offset the benefits of collaborating by the need to access shared administration.…”

“…Researchers will look for collaborators in an effort to pool and leverage funds and share the cost of projects ( Birnholtz, 2006 ; Fox and Faver, 1984 ; Georghiou, 1998 ; Katz and Martin, 1997 ; Kraut et al, 1987 ; Wagner and Leydesdorff, 2005 ). While some rank monetary gains as a primary motivator for collaboration ( Langford et al, 2006 ; Lee, 2000 ), others place less importance on these financial benefits when compared to other intangibles ( Turpin and Garrett-Jones, 2010 ). The need to access funds appears to be motivated by a desire to advance one's own research agenda rather than the potential for personal financial gains, even in industry-academia collaborations ( D’Este and Perkmann, 2011 ; Lee, 2000 ).…”

“…Wray (2006) argues that scientists concerned with receiving adequate recognition for their work on collaborative projects may shy away from interdisciplinary, collaborative work. This deterrent requires management and investigation as to the sector-specific and cross-sector needs for reward and recognition ( Parthaa and David, 1994 ; Turpin and Garrett-Jones, 2010 ). However, for some, collaboration provides more opportunities for reward and recognition otherwise unattainable in a strictly disciplinary environment ( Turpin and Garrett-Jones, 2010 ).…”

Beneath the tip of the iceberg: exploring the multiple forms of university–industry linkages

“…The demands of an entrepreneurial approach require focusing on execution, the short term transformation into sellable products, and the obtainment of profit. Such a transformation is influenced by economic and other intangible stimuli (Turpin and Garrett-Jones 2010) through the incentives and rewards system operating in job appointments and scientific careers.…”

Shifting Paradigms in Information Flow: An Open Science Framework (OSF) for Knowledge Sharing Teams

“…These internal conflicts can impede one's ability to adequately share information, trust a team or network, and even hamper the advancement of a science program especially if knowledge is withheld as a result of such insecurities . Loss aversion (Fox & Faver, 1984;Georghiou, 1988;Sonnenwald, 2007), lack of recognition and reward (Dasgupta & David, 1994;Turpin & Garrett-Jones, 2010), concerns about achieving promotion and tenure (Carayol & Thi, 2005;Coleman, 1986;Harris, Lyon, & Clarke, 2009;Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004;Maglaughlin & Sonnenwald, 2005;Rhoten & Parker, 2004;Zucker, 2012), and authorship embattlements (Barrett, Funk, & Macrina, 2005;Lewis, Ross, & Holden, 2012;Stokols et al, 2008) are just a few of the issues that can ensue from within a scientific team that struggles with diverse attitudes about knowledge sharing.…”