Reward of legislating: member’s legislative performance and lobbyists’ personal contributions

Gui, Fred

doi:10.1057/s41309-022-00171-2

Cited by 2 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…For example, Barber's (2016) survey of campaign donors during the 2012 Senate election finds that PACs tend to be access-oriented when giving money to candidates. Similarly, Box-Steffensmeier and Grant (1999) find that committee chairs and more "effective" legislators tend to receive more contributions from PACs, while Gui (2023) has found that lobbyists give money to legislators with higher legislative effectiveness scores, which implies an investment orientation in their giving. 3…”

Section: The Investment Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The investment theory of giving assumes that out-ofstate donors who give to senators "off-cycle" do so to obtain access and influence. The implication is that donors will target legislators in positions of power and influence, such as members of the majority party, committee chairs, and "effective" legislators with a proven track record of success (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999;Gui 2023). By contrast, the consumer model assumes that campaign contributions are not spontaneous; rather, donors give because they are asked to give by politicians.…”

Section: Theory: the Motivations Of Non-resident Donorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3. Box-Steffensmeier and Grant (1999) measure legislative effectiveness as "the percentage of bills a member sponsors that make it into law" (p. 514), while Gui (2023) uses data from the Center for Effective Lawmaking. 4.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Out-Of-State Donors and Legislative Surrogacy in the U.S. Senate

Keena

2024

Political Research Quarterly

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Studies show that the extraordinary growth in campaign expenditures is fueled by a small, elite subset of the donor population that gives generously to candidates across the country. It is often assumed that the wealthy influence policy outcomes through such gifts to politicians; however, the representational benefits of giving to politicians out-of-state are unclear. What do donors gain legislatively when they give to legislators living out-of-state? I study the campaign financing of US senators over three decades (1989–2018) and find that senators receive the most money from out-of-state donors when they face reelection and risk losing. In this context, donors invest in the collective benefits of party representation when they give money to out-of-state senators. However, when giving to senators “off cycle,” out-of-state donors behave as “consumers” who reward senators for the positions they have taken. Each bill sponsored by a senator when they are not up for reelection leads to a corresponding increase of about 1% in receipts from out-of-state donors. These results offer a more complete view of the legislative surrogacy that the wealthy receive when they give to politicians out-of-state and suggest possible links between campaign contributions and public policy outcomes.

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Section: The Investment Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theory: the Motivations Of Non-resident Donorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Out-Of-State Donors and Legislative Surrogacy in the U.S. Senate

Keena

2024

Political Research Quarterly

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“…8 8 For instance, Box‐Steffensmeier and Grant (1999) use data from the 103rd and 104th US Congresses to show that PACs contribute more to “effective” representatives. In the same direction, Gui (2023) accounts for a positive relationship between the number of proposals and campaign contributions from lobbyists' assets (108th and 115th US Congresses). …”

mentioning

confidence: 94%

When Do Interest Groups Lobby Legislators in Strong Presidential Systems?

Dockendorff¹,

Lodato

2023

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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When do interest groups target legislators to approach or lobby under strong presidentialism? This article explores two hypotheses. First, interest groups and lobbyists seek to access committee chairs with gatekeeping power, even in those jurisdictions where the executive holds (most) exclusivity to initiate legislation (Gatekeeping Hypothesis). Second, interest groups and lobbyists target legislators who introduce more bills on issues that concern them but only on policy areas outside the executive's exclusive sphere (Legislative Activity Hypothesis). We test these hypotheses with evidence from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. We have coded and analysed 6479 lobbying audiences and over 2300 bills.

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Reward of legislating: member’s legislative performance and lobbyists’ personal contributions

Cited by 2 publications

References 38 publications

Out-Of-State Donors and Legislative Surrogacy in the U.S. Senate

Out-Of-State Donors and Legislative Surrogacy in the U.S. Senate

When Do Interest Groups Lobby Legislators in Strong Presidential Systems?

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