Revolving doors on Wall Street

Cornaggia, Jess; Cornaggia, Kimberly J.; Xia, Han

doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.01.007

Cited by 128 publications

(47 citation statements)

References 39 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…As seen in Panel C of Table 5, none of the case outcomes differ between younger and more mature lawyers. Cornaggia et al (2013) find that analysts that leave credit rating agencies to join the firm they rated tend to be tough raters, except in the last year prior to leaving. The lawyer's last year of employment at the SEC is likely to be associated with magnified conflicts of interest and associated with reduced enforcement efforts under both the human capital and rent 30 We note that the main effect of SEC_SPECIALIST is no longer significant in Panel A, column 2 of Table 5.…”

Section: Younger Lawyersmentioning

confidence: 90%

The revolving door and the SEC’s enforcement outcomes: Initial evidence from civil litigation

deHaan

Kedia

Koh

et al. 2015

Journal of Accounting and Economics

113

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Younger Lawyersmentioning

confidence: 90%

The revolving door and the SEC’s enforcement outcomes: Initial evidence from civil litigation

deHaan

Kedia

Koh

et al. 2015

Journal of Accounting and Economics

113

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…LinkedIn is a valuable professional‐oriented social network providing useful information about careers and business network (Bradbury, ). According to Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Xia (), this web service has been used in previous studies as a primary source of an individual's demographic information. In their investigation of audit partner rotation among US publicly listed firms, Laurion, Lawrence, and Ryans () use both Google and LinkedIn to confirm that the named individuals are indeed audit partners.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Gender‐diverse audit partners and audit fee premium: The case of mandatory joint audit

Nekhili

Javed

Chtioui³

2018

Int J Auditing

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study empirically investigates the impact of auditor gender on audit fees in a unique audit regulatory environment, namely France, where joint audit is mandatory by law. Apart from the fact that male and female auditor engagement partners have distinctive behaviors and style, the question also arises at to whether coordination problems between two competing audit firms are exacerbated or mitigated by the presence of a female auditor in the joint auditor pair composition. This issue could be more challenging in the context of International Financial Reporting Standards adoption, which increases audit task complexity, audit risk, and audit effort required for an audit engagement. Using a matched sample of firms from the CAC All‐Shares Index listed on Euronext Paris from 2002 to 2010, we find that, when a female auditor is paired with a male auditor, the difference in audit fees stems not only from the presence of the female auditor partner but also from male–female interaction within the joint auditor pair composition. In a supplementary analysis, we show that the impact on audit fees of both the presence of a female partner and male–female auditor interaction is dependent, but in a different way, on the number of Big 4 audit firms in the auditor pair composition.

show abstract

“…Cornaggia et al . () find that rating analysts may inflate the ratings of their future employers before switching jobs, thus supporting the quid‐pro‐quo hypothesis.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 60%

Politically connected independent directors and corporate fraud in China

Kong

Xiang

Zhang

et al. 2019

Accounting & Finance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study investigates the effect of politically connected independent directors on a firm's likelihood of committing fraud in China. We classify the political backgrounds of independent directors into three categories based on their employment histories: local background, central background, and local and central background. Using corporate fraud data from 2000 to 2014, we find that independent directors with local political backgrounds significantly reduce the likelihood of a firm committing fraud. Further analysis shows that locally connected independent directors are more likely to have both employment experience in regulatory agencies and financial/accounting/law expertise.

show abstract

Revolving doors on Wall Street

Cited by 128 publications

References 39 publications

The revolving door and the SEC’s enforcement outcomes: Initial evidence from civil litigation

The revolving door and the SEC’s enforcement outcomes: Initial evidence from civil litigation

Gender‐diverse audit partners and audit fee premium: The case of mandatory joint audit

Politically connected independent directors and corporate fraud in China

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About