Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem

Berejikian, Jeffrey D.

doi:10.2307/1964128

Cited by 73 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…In prospect-theoretic treatments of the foregoing issue, an actor's valuation of the status quo determines the actor's attitude toward risk and thereby the actor's risk-related behaviors (Berejikian, 1992(Berejikian, , 1997(Berejikian, , 2002Haas, 2001;Levi & Whyte, 1997;Levy, 1996Levy, , 1997Levy, , 2002McDermott, 1998;Weyland, 1996). An extension of the finding that actors are risk averse over gains and risk acceptant over losses suggests that a decision maker will choose the risk-averse act, not threaten, when the value of the status quo is positive and will choose the risk-preferring act, threaten, when the value of the status quo is negative.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The presumption is that Challenger will threaten only when the perceived loss is sufficiently large and sufficiently negative. Other studies imply that even a moderate loss or, even stronger, any negative valuation of the status quo is sufficient to induce risk-seeking behavior (Haas, 2001;Berejikian, 1992Berejikian, , 2002. 183 Tversky and Kahneman (1992, 301-302) argue, however, that risk-related behaviors are determined jointly by both the valuation and the probability weighting function.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sequential Analysis of Deterrence Games with a Declining Status Quo

Carlson

Dacey

2006

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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The model developed in this paper provides a formal prospect theory account of Challenger's behavior in the traditional deterrence game played under sequential decision analysis. The model is used to analyze two basic claims commonly made in the international relations literature regarding the importation of prospect theory into the analysis of crisis games. These claims pertain to Challenger's behavior when the valuation of the status quo is positive and Challenger's behavior when the valuation of the status quo is negative.We model the traditional deterrence game between Challenger and Defender as a one-sided incomplete information game where Challenger is uncertain about Defender's preference ordering. We examine the behavior of Challenger under the condition that the status quo is declining, using a von Neumann-Morgenstern decision rule as specified by expected utility theory, and a Kahneman-Tverksy decision rule as specified by prospect theory.The formal results show that these claims do not hold unconditionally and must be stated more precisely. Furthermore, there exist conditions under which the claims are false. We show that in addition to specifying the valuation of the status quo and the value of the probability of loss, as per the claims, a fuller understanding of Challenger's behavior also requires a specification of Challenger's valuation of the status quo vis-à-vis the valuations of other major payoffs in the game. In so doing, we capture many of the details relevant to a more complete analysis of Challenger's behavior in the deterrence game.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sequential Analysis of Deterrence Games with a Declining Status Quo

Carlson

Dacey

2006

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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“…1 People tend to accept risk when choosing between losses because the risk offers the potential to escape losses altogether, not because of the perceived likelihood of success associated with the option or the need for some positive payoff (Berejikian, 1992).…”

Section: An Overview Of Prospect Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Support and Nonsupport for Nationalist Rebellion: A Prospect Theory Approach

Masters

2004

Political Psychology

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Prospect theory has been advanced as one way to link intentional rebellious action and the influence of social conditions on individual decisions to support such action. This study extends the application of prospect theory by explaining tendencies toward action or inaction among individuals within identical social contexts. Put simply, the way in which people define reference points has an effect on how they perceive violent options. These perceptions may invoke inaction biases among members of a constituent community. This explanation is explored with illustrative examples drawn from interviews with individuals who supported or did not support rebellious action in Northern Ireland (in 1998) and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (in 1999). The interview data suggest that territorial demands are an important factor in how rebellious options are perceived.KEY WORDS: prospect theory, collective action, ethnonational rebellion, territoriality Students of political behavior in general, and of violent behavior specifically, must at some point address the issue of participation versus nonparticipation. Participants in violent action engage in, or threaten, coercion for political ends. The costs of participation tend to be very high; the benefit of such action is a simple public good shared equally by all, regardless of whether they participate. As such, the tendency to free-ride on the efforts of others is strong, hence few participants seek the public good. However, to acquire the public good often requires that many people participate. Thus, the task facing rebels is to overcome free riding in order to acquire the public good.In Mark Irving Lichbach's The Rebel 's Dilemma (1995), the author identifies a series of solutions to the free-rider problem, all centering on how to alter costbenefit analysis in order to mobilize potential participants. One solution is referred to as "changing the type of public good" or "seeking public bads" (Lichbach, 1995, p. 107). In basic form, the solution suggests: "The initial task of the revo-

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“…This project originated as a meta-theoretical analysis of structure and agency as they relate to regime change (Mahoney and Snyder 1999;Berejikian 1992;Kitschelt 1992;Sil 2000). At their extremes, neither structure nor agency gives an adequate account of regime change.…”

Section: Up a Creek Without A Paradigmmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Plenty of people have addressed this already (Mahoney and Snyder 1999;Berejikian 1992;Kitschelt 1992;Sil 2000). Nor is positing space as structure especially significant or novel (Sewell 2001).…”

Section: Up a Creek Without A Paradigmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contentious spaces : a comparative analysis of Latin American resistance campaigns, 1956-2006.

Welch¹

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Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem

Cited by 73 publications

References 28 publications

Sequential Analysis of Deterrence Games with a Declining Status Quo

Sequential Analysis of Deterrence Games with a Declining Status Quo

Support and Nonsupport for Nationalist Rebellion: A Prospect Theory Approach

Contentious spaces : a comparative analysis of Latin American resistance campaigns, 1956-2006.

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