The English School concept of practice is what Stephen Turner in The Social Theory of Practices calls a ‘telic’ notion. A telic practice is an activity seeking a goal ‘which is conceived as a result of following certain general principles of procedure’. Examples of telic practices are playing a game of chess, holding a seminar, baptizing a baby or going fly-fishing. Such practices are carried out according to standards of excellence set forth in some tradition of interpretation. Maurice Keens-Soper has placed de Caillèires’ De la maniere de negocier avec les souverains in a tradition of interpretation applied to diplomacy, and one that set standards. A practice in the English School sense is not a private idea: a commitment to communal standards is required if one is to talk meaningfully of a practice. A telic notion of practice may be contrasted with a causal notion. In the causal notion, a practice is a form of mentalist ‘object’ which impinges on behaviour. Pierre Bourdieu (1977), for example, is interested in practices as hidden convictions or habits shared by a group; his ‘habitus’ informs social action. Either as a kind of presupposition, or as a kind of mental trace, a practice in the causal sense disposes thought or action in a certain way. In this form, practices are not directly accessible, their existence must be inferred, and the means of accessing them are fraught with difficulties. A person engaging in a telic practice is guided by its standards rather than being caused to perform, and telic practices are directly accessible to empirical investigation.