Revisiting the role of civic organizations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan: Confidence, membership, and democratic practice

Abstract

In many emerging and authoritarian countries, civil society organizations that focus on political or sensitive policy issues are being cracked down upon, while serviceoriented ones are given a relatively greater ability to operate. What might the consequence of this be for democratic practice given the important role civic organizations play in this process? We examine this question by considering whether the absence of confidence in a country's governing institutions is related to membership in service-rather than governance-focused civic organizations, and how such membership is associated with elite-challenging, political activities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. We find that individuals who have no confidence in state institutions are less likely to seek membership in governancefocused civic organizations, but not necessarily in service-focused ones. At the same time, membership in both types of civic organizations is associated with participation in political activities, while beliefs that a country is run democratically decreases it. This suggests that a variety of civic organizational types, even those without an explicit governance-focus, contingent on perceptions of democratic governance and other covariates held constant, enhance democratic practice. K E Y W O R D Scivic organizations, confidence in institutions, perceived democratic practice, political action | INTRODUCTIONAs recently as the summer of 2021, Kyrgyzstan's President Sadyr Japarov signed a bill into law that would increase reporting requirements for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) doing work in his country. Some critics of the law saw it as a thinly veiled attack on organizations that have been investigating and exposing corruption among high-ranking officials in his government (Talant, 2021). This also coincides with a designation by leading international watchdogs that the country is now firmly under an authoritarian rule (Freedom House, 2019, which indiscriminately harasses opposition figures, news outlets, and even ordinary individuals who post on social media platforms. After years of flirting with democracy, such backsliding into authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan is weakening democratic practices in the country and is shrinking the existing platforms for democratic voice. Similar legislation has been in the works in Tajikistan, with a particular focus on foreign funding sources of local NGOs (Jamshed, 2020), while two separate NGO bills were enacted in Kazakhstan in 2015 and 2016, which reportedly allow tax authorities in the country to harass civic organizations (Human Rights Watch, 2020). This trend aligns with events elsewhere, whereby in authoritarian countries, developing democracies, and backsliding democracies (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Turkey) civil society organizations (CSOs) that are focused on improving governance have become subject to increased scrutiny by host governments in recent 26 -

Unpacking ‘public silence’: Civil society activism under authoritarian rule in Ethiopia

“…To explain variations in co‐optation and control of CSOs in authoritarian settings, research has explored variations between different policy sectors and found that repression of CSOs is particularly high where organisations work on politically contentious topics and advocacy rather than service provision (Hildebrandt, 2013; Yerkes, 2012). While those insights are interesting, they fail to account for the fact that service provision and policy advocacy often overlap (Fisher Melton, 2023; Herrold & AbouAssi, 2023; Moldavanova et al., 2023; Moldogaziev & Witko, 2023). Moreover, they are ill suited to explain why CSOs working on the same topics sometimes differ regarding their ability and willingness to drive an independent agenda from the state (Pellerin, 2019b).…”