Revisiting Political Islam: Explaining the Nexus Between Political Islam and Contentious Politics in the Arab World*

Abstract

Objective This study (1) introduces a new framework to conceptualize and measure political Islam, and (2) examines the empirical nexus among Islamic religiosity, ideological support for political Islam (ISPI), and collective protests in the Arab Middle East. Methods Analyzing cross‐national attitudes in five Arab states, I conduct a principal component analysis to construct a new index to account for a variation in ISPI, and examine the effects thereof on participation in collective protests. Results The evidence shows that Islamic religiosity matters in challenging political elites via collective action. While politically moderate Muslims appear more likely to engage in nonviolent, collective political protests, political radicals seem less likely to do so. Conclusion The findings suggest that political ideology plays a central role in moderating the intricate relationship between Islam and collective political activism. The evidence also supports the resource mobilization thesis, among other factors, to explain the dynamics of collective action in the Arab world.

Machiavellianism, Islamism, and Deprivations as Predictors of Support for Daesh Among Muslims

“…An important advantage of this approach stems from its capability to define which individuals in which situations are most likely to embrace Islamist extremism in the form of support for Daesh. While, in line with the earlier literature (e.g., Achilov, 2016;van Zomeren, 2008;Franc & Pavlović, 2018), we expected to confirm the relationship between Islamism and support for Daesh, while the expected effects of deprivations were somewhat lower, with socio-political deprivation having a larger effect than economic deprivation, multiple hypotheses regarding the potential relationship between Machiavellianism and support for Daesh were developed. We hypothesised that Machiavellianism does not have to contribute to radicalisation per se, but may be moderated by deprivations or Islamism.…”

“…This is an expected result, as Daesh is an Islamist organisation. Although many, particularly moderate, Islamists are not in favour of Daesh, the way Islamism was measured in this study (as a preference for non-democratic systems of Islamist government), tends towards the more extreme forms of Islamism, which Daesh represents (Achilov, 2016;Grinin, 2019). It is worth noting that we cannot be certain of the causal direction of the relationship: whether it is interested in Islamism as an ideology, which inspires respondent's support for Daesh, or vice versa.…”

“…Islamism is a very heterogeneous movement also in terms of ideology (Achilov, 2016). Most of the supporters of Islamist ideology are what we might call 'moderate Islamists', meaning they want to achieve their objectives without intimidation and violence, and while respecting the law and political systems.…”

“…Support for (politically radical) Islamism was measured using a five-item (q5184, q5182, q605, q6061, q6063) measure of Islamism proposed by Achilov (2016). According to the author, items related to intolerance towards political pluralism, neglect for democratic elections and competition, and exclusive support for the rule of Sharia law and promotion of political roles of clerics represent the key concepts of politically radical Islamism.…”

Политические Аспекты Современного Исламизма

“…Мы опираемся на теорию модернизации, теорию депривации [см. Гринин 2017], современные теории революции [Goldstone 2001[Goldstone , 2011, теорию ресурсной мобилизации [Tilly 1978], которая, по определению С. Сандерсона [Sanderson 2010: 69], подходит ко всем главным формам коллективных акций или насильственных действий, а также теорию исламского возрождения [Хантингтон 2003] и теории политического ислама [Kepel 1987[Kepel , 2000Achilov 2016;Achilov, Sen 2017;Игнатенко 2004;Мирский 2015;Левин 2014; Царегородцева 2017 и др.] и постисламизма [Bayat 2013;Amin 2016] и др.…”