Revisiting minimum profit conditions in uniform price day-ahead electricity auctions

Madani, Mehdi; Vyve, Mathieu Van

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2017.10.024

Cited by 22 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 14 publications

(43 reference statements)

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“…The paper concludes that the restrictions could be relaxed, both concerning the block size restrictions as well as on the number of blocks that a participant can submit per day. Madani and Vyve [22] present a market model to examine nonconvex uniform price auctions, where bidders, either consumers or producers, can specify a minimum profit or maximum payment condition. Those conditions are similar to EUPHEMIA order types, however when compared to the MIC orders of the OMIE power exchange, they have advantages, including faster implementation of the methodology and better representation of the operating constraints of the power units.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy Implications of Power Exchanges on Operational Scheduling: Evaluating EUPHEMIA’s Market Products in Case of Greece

Koltsaklis

Dagoumas

2018

Energies

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A vital component for the development of a functioning internal electricity market is the adoption by each European member state of the Pan-European Hybrid Electricity Market Integration (EUPHEMIA) for the day-ahead market solution. The consideration of the national power market’s characteristics enables more realistic market design towards the implementation of the so-called “Target Model”. This work considers a series of factors, including the EUPHEMIA order types, their use by market participants, the relative competitiveness of power generators, the impact of interconnected markets, the existence of market players with dominant positions, and the existence of specific regulations such as the minimum average variable cost restriction on offers by producers, as well as the strategy adopted by market participants. The main goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis on the adoption of EUPHEMIA’s algorithm in case of the Greek wholesale market, based on a relevant research project funded by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission to support the Hellenic Regulatory Authority of Energy on its decision-making. The paper contributes to the relevant literature on the quantification of the impacts of the EUPHEMIA algorithm in the case of the Greek wholesale market, providing insights on the crucial aspects affecting realistic, market-based decision-making.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy Implications of Power Exchanges on Operational Scheduling: Evaluating EUPHEMIA’s Market Products in Case of Greece

Koltsaklis

Dagoumas

2018

Energies

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“…Hence, we can strictly increase SW , which contradicts the optimality. In the case where G m = G m , then we necessarily have D m < D m (otherwise λ n = −2ã n (D n − D * n ) − µ n < 0 which is impossible from (9c)), and we can strictly increase D m instead of decreasing G m in (17), leading to the same contradiction.…”

Section: Centralized Market Designmentioning

confidence: 95%

Peer-to-peer electricity market analysis: From variational to Generalized Nash Equilibrium

Cadre¹,

Jacquot

Wan³

et al. 2020

European Journal of Operational Research

119

134

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We consider a network of prosumers involved in peer-to-peer energy exchanges, with differentiation price preferences on the trades with their neighbors, and we analyze two market designs: (i) a centralized market, used as a benchmark, where a global market operator optimizes the flows (trades) between the nodes, local demand and flexibility activation to maximize the system overall social welfare; (ii) a distributed peer-to-peer market design where prosumers in local energy communities optimize selfishly their trades, demand, and flexibility activation.We first characterize the solution of the peer-to-peer market as a Variational Equilibrium and prove that the set of Variational Equilibria coincides with the set of social welfare optimal solutions of market design (i). We give several results that help understanding the structure of the trades at an equilibrium or at the optimum. We characterize the impact of preferences on the network line congestion and renewable energy waste under both designs. We provide a reduced example for which we give the set of all possible generalized equilibria, which enables to give an approximation of the price of anarchy. We provide a more realistic example which relies on the IEEE 14-bus network, for which we can simulate the trades under different preference prices. Our analysis shows in particular that the preferences have a large impact on the structure of the trades, but that one equilibrium (variational) is optimal.

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“…Reference [26] formulates a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) to clear the market with an additional iterative process to handle PRBs. Reference [27] proposes a primal-dual formulation of the market clearing problem, where an improved Benders-like decomposition method is further introduced to strengthen the classical Benders cuts, which is extended in [28]. In [19] a clearing method to minimize the impact of PRBs on the final solution is proposed.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The objective function of the final MILP model is defined in (28), whereas the problem's constraints are:…”

Section: Appendix a The Final Milp Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

A new approach to electricity market clearing with uniform purchase price and curtailable block orders

et al. 2018

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The European market clearing problem is characterized by a set of heterogeneous orders and rules that force the implementation of heuristic and iterative solving methods. In particular, curtailable block orders and the uniform purchase price pose serious difficulties. A block order spans over multiple hours, and can be either fully accepted or fully rejected. The uniform purchase price prescribes that all consumers pay a common price in all the zones, while producers receive zonal prices, which can differ from one zone to another.The market clearing problem in the presence of both the uniform purchase price and block orders is a major open issue in the European context. The uniform purchase price scheme leads to a non-linear optimization problem involving both primal and dual variables, whereas block orders introduce multi-temporal constraints and binary variables into the problem. As a consequence, the market clearing problem in the presence of both block orders and the uniform purchase price can be regarded as a non-linear integer programming problem involving both primal and dual variables with complementary and multi-temporal constraints.The aim of this paper is to present a non-iterative and heuristic-free approach for solving the market clearing problem in the presence of both curtailable block orders and the uniform purchase price scheme. The solution is exact, with no approximation up to the level of resolution of current market data. By resorting to an equivalent uniform purchase price formulation, the proposed approach results in a mixed-integer linear program, which is built starting from a non-linear integer bilevel programming problem. Numerical results using real market data are reported to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach. The model has been implemented in Python, and the code is freely available on a public repository.

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Revisiting minimum profit conditions in uniform price day-ahead electricity auctions

Cited by 22 publications

References 14 publications

Policy Implications of Power Exchanges on Operational Scheduling: Evaluating EUPHEMIA’s Market Products in Case of Greece

Policy Implications of Power Exchanges on Operational Scheduling: Evaluating EUPHEMIA’s Market Products in Case of Greece

Peer-to-peer electricity market analysis: From variational to Generalized Nash Equilibrium

A new approach to electricity market clearing with uniform purchase price and curtailable block orders

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