Revising the SIOP: Taking War-Fighting to Dangerous Extremes

Ball, Desmond; Toth, Robert C.

doi:10.2307/2538751

Cited by 62 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Durante la mayor parte de la Guerra Fría, esto se realizaba mediante la elaboración -por parte del Pentágono-de la Política Nacional de Selección de Blancos y sistemas -los ICBM Peacekeeper y Trident, los misiles de crucero Tomahawk y Gryphon o los bombarderos B-1 Lancer-capaces de realizar ataques contrafuerza de precisión. Por último, desarrolló sofisticados sistemas de reconocimiento para identificar cualquier actividad soviética en tiempo de paz y posibilitar la selección de blancos móviles -como las lanzaderas de ICBM-en tiempo de guerra (Ball y Toth, 1990;Colom-Piella, 2015. Para comunicar la disuasión, Washington filtró las secciones de la PD-59 y NSDD-13 que detallaban la selección de los blancos para que el Kremlin advirtiera que era el primer objetivo de Washington y que su decapitación comprometería la continuidad del régimen, erosionaría el control interno y colapsaría la defensa nacional (Barrass, 2009: 234).…”

Section: Las Opciones Selectivasunclassified

Haciendo posible lo impensable: opciones selectivas, disuasión a medida y fallos en la disuasión nuclear (1974-1994)

Piella¹

2020

Rev. Esp. Cienc. Polít.

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The article is aimed at studying the selective options, a nuclear weapons employment doctrine launched by the United States in 1974 to reinforce its deterrent position by enabling a limited nuclear war. However, by widening the military gap with the Soviet Union and exploiting its worst fears, the implementation of this doctrine almost caused a nuclear crisis in 1983. Since this constitutes one of the few known nuclear deterrence failures, the study of this historical case may contribute to explaining the working of this process which is regaining its central role in the field of Strategic Studies. The article is divided into two parts: the first theoretical part delves into the literature on deterrence up to the fourth wave of studies on the phenomenon and the consolidation of tailored deterrence models. The second one, as a historical case study, analyzes the selective options. It is argued that this doctrine, in force during the last stage of the Cold War, does not only constitute a proto-model of tailor-made deterrence, but its realization also caused a failure of deterrence that fortunately did not culminate in catastrophe. Even if the few cases of nuclear deterrence failures prevent drawing general conclusions, the article concludes by warning about the contextuality, credibility and relativism of deterrence.

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Section: Las Opciones Selectivasunclassified

Haciendo posible lo impensable: opciones selectivas, disuasión a medida y fallos en la disuasión nuclear (1974-1994)

Piella¹

2020

Rev. Esp. Cienc. Polít.

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“…By 1961, US war planners sought to rationalize a vast set of military logics and capabilities into a comprehensive war plan—known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP. The first plan, known as SIOP-62, promised to reduce contingency and error, and to coordinate a US war machine that included bombers, submarines, and missiles deployed globally, as well as a vast array of front-line nuclear technologies, from nuclear cannons to backpack bombs to atomic land mines (Ball and Toth, 1990; Burr, 2004; Keeney, 2011; Sagan, 1987).…”

Section: From Gaither To the Siop: Shaping Understandingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Terror as normality

Masco¹

2013

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

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Reflecting on two US-engineered Cold War programs and plans, the author finds how terror, over past decades, has become a normal element in everyday US life. The historic period that saw the Corona satellite and the Single Integrated Operational Plan come to light, the author argues, taught Americans to be committed to total war as a precondition for everyday lifeÑwhile locating death as exterior to the nation.

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“…On April 15,1961, the first Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) was instituted (see box.) In January 1988, President Reagan directed the following: 9 "Our strategic forces and the associated targeting policy must, by any calculation, be perceived as making warfare a totally unacceptable and unrewarding proposition for the Soviet leadership. Accordingly, our targeting policy:…”

Section: Effect Of Nuclear Detonationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nuclear targeting philosophy for India

Kanwal

2000

Strategic Analysis

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Revising the SIOP: Taking War-Fighting to Dangerous Extremes

Cited by 62 publications

References 10 publications

Haciendo posible lo impensable: opciones selectivas, disuasión a medida y fallos en la disuasión nuclear (1974-1994)

Haciendo posible lo impensable: opciones selectivas, disuasión a medida y fallos en la disuasión nuclear (1974-1994)

Terror as normality

Nuclear targeting philosophy for India

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