Reviews of Books:Poor People's Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita Javier Auyero

Walter, Richard J.

doi:10.1086/532394

Cited by 9 publications

(25 citation statements)

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“…In Latin America, too, accounts of how party machines mobilize the votes of poor citizens by dispensing particularistic benefits abound. This is documented in the case of Argentina (Auyero 2001;Calvo and Murillo 2004;Dinatale 2004;Stokes 2005;Nichter 2008;Weitz-Shapiro 2012;Murillo et al 2021), Brazil (Zucco 2013), Colombia (Rueda 2017), Guatemala (González-Ocantos et al 2020; Mexico (Fox 1994;Magaloni 2006;Díaz-Cayeros et al 2015;Castro Cornejo and Beltrán 2020), Paraguay (Finan and Schechter 2012), Peru (Schady 2000;Gans-Morse et al 2014), and Venezuela (Kornblith 2002;Penfold-Becerra 2008).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 97%

Poverty, Partisanship, and Vote Buying in Latin America

Justesen¹,

Manzetti²

2023

Lat Am Polit Soc

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Electoral contests in Latin America are often characterized by attempts by political parties to sway the outcome of elections using vote buying—a practice that seems to persist during elections throughout the region. This article examines how clientelist parties’ use of vote buying is jointly shaped by two voter traits: poverty and partisanship. We hypothesize that clientelist parties pursue a mixed strategy, broadly targeting their core voters but also poor swing voters. While most of the existing evidence comes from single-country studies, this study adds cross-national evidence from multilevel regressions of survey data from 22 Latin American countries. Empirically, we find that poverty matters mainly for swing voters. For partisans, the effect of poverty on vote buying is weaker. These results suggest that poverty plays an important role in vote-buying strategies—but also that partisanship moderates clientelistic parties’ vote-buying strategies during electoral campaigns.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 97%

Poverty, Partisanship, and Vote Buying in Latin America

Justesen¹,

Manzetti²

2023

Lat Am Polit Soc

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“…Consequently, Evita's personal aesthetics—her penchant for bourgeois markers of femininity, such as fine furs and designer dresses—necessarily play a role in fashioning femme populism in contemporary Argentina. Peronist women militants and leaders have consciously self‐fashioned themselves after her (Auyero, 2000).…”

Section: Eva Perón: a Harbinger Of Femme Populismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Femme populism: Vulnerability and desire in Argentine political aesthetics

Fierman

2023

Ethos

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This article focuses on the role of vulnerability and desire in populist politics. I examine the political aesthetics of Argentine populism by analyzing media and supporters' representations of Argentine politician Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. The populist leader tends to conjure the image of the strongman who is either an avuncular man of the people or a muscular, industrious worker. In contrast, Kirchner's followers focus on her sexual appeal and her emotional vulnerability. Drawing on Lacanian notions of love and desire, I argue that Cristinistas' sustained focus on their leader's appearance and emotional state reveals the libidinal dimensions of populist politics. Moreover, the fetishization of Cristina as incomparably beautiful and bereaved indicates a deeply phallocentric conception of sovereignty. While Cristina's supporters tout her femininity as a departure from the political status quo, their focus on her image and persona reinforces phallocentric conceptions of sovereignty.

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“…One strand of this literature focuses on the relationship between brokers and voters. Some scholars study the various strategies used by brokers to mobilize voters, including material incentives (e.g., money or favors [Auyero ] and access to government programs [Diaz‐Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni ]) or violence and intimidation (Cruz ; Mares and Young ; Robinson and Torvik ).…”

Section: Related Literature and Theoretical Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The role of teachers as political brokers is nicely summed up by Ornelas (2012), who cites an SNTE leader referring to teachers as "electoral plumbers." Effective political brokers need to be close to their community and identify which voters are more likely to respond to their influence (Auyero 2000;Finan and Schechter 2012;Zarazaga 2014). Teachers do so in many different ways, both during the course of their jobs and within the community.…”

Section: Teachers As Brokersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Brokers are responsible for mobilizing voters through clientelistic and vote‐buying strategies that are critical to electoral success. However, while recent work has documented the electoral impact of brokers (Cantú ; Larreguy ; Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin ; Rueda ), as well as the different strategies they pursue to mobilize voters (e.g., see Auyero ; Diaz‐Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni ; Mares and Young ), we have little understanding of the drivers of brokers' efforts. This limits our ability to comprehend the politics of contexts in which clientelism plays an important role in shaping electoral outcomes.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teachers' Union

Larreguy

Olea

Querubín

2017

American J Political Sci

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Political brokers mobilize voters all over the world, yet little is known about what motivates them to do so. This article theorizes about two drivers of brokers' efforts: (1) incentives—monetary rewards or sanctions—and monitoring and (2) partisan attachment. We examine our theory using data on the Mexican National Educational Workers Union (SNTE), Latin America's largest union and a well‐known political machine. Consistent with the role of teachers as brokers, we find that the vote share of parties supported by the SNTE machine is higher in polling stations located in schools. This effect is absent when teachers are asked to mobilize voters in support of a party for which they have no partisan attachment, and it is uncorrelated with the union's monitoring capacity. This suggests that partisan attachment, rather than incentives and monitoring, explains the SNTE's effectiveness as a political machine.

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Reviews of Books:Poor People's Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita Javier Auyero

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

Poverty, Partisanship, and Vote Buying in Latin America

Poverty, Partisanship, and Vote Buying in Latin America

Femme populism: Vulnerability and desire in Argentine political aesthetics

Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents? Evidence from the Mexican Teachers' Union

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