Review: Brian Shelmerdine, British Representations of the Spanish Civil War, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006; vi + 185 pp; £50.00 hbk; ISBN: 0719074150 Dominic Tierney, FDR and the Spanish Civil War: Neutrality and Commitment in the Struggle that Divided America, Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2007; x + 224 pp; £48.00 hbk; ISBN: 9780822340553; £12.99 pbk; ISBN: 9780822340768

Abstract

When the Spanish Civil War began in July 1936 with a military coup d'état intended to overthrow Spain's legally elected democratic Republic, Republicans and their supporters hoped that other democracies -especially the United States and Great Britain -would intervene against the military rebellion. To their frustration, and despite the major campaigns waged to achieve this cooperation, the official foreign policy of major international powers was one of non-intervention from beginning to end.Though it is a well-known fact that the British and Americans refused to aid the Spanish government, just why this was the case is still being debated and explored by historians. From the point of view of those sympathetic to the Republican cause, another question is how non-intervention was pulled off, when by international law democracies were obliged to sell arms to Spain. In the case of both countries, there were, of course, economic and political issues at stake, including investments in Spain and the fear of taking any action that might lead to a larger European conflict. In addition to these concrete interests, international perceptions of the war and of Spaniards were influential in keeping the non-intervention and embargo policies in place, despite the fact that their 'impartiality' became progressively unconvincing. Throughout the war many Britons and North Americans considered the line their governments took towards Spain tragically unfair, and dissent only intensified as the conflict evolved and it became clear that 'Non-intervention' was in fact a one-sided position, as Italy and Germany were bolstering Franco's side. (2006) explore, respectively, British and North American perceptions of the war and the interrelation of these with foreign policy decisions. As their titles suggest, the authors' focuses are quite different, but the overlaps are significant. Shelmerdine concentrates on the influence of British images of Spain and Spaniards on foreign policy, and Tierney offers an intimate portrait of FDR's ambivalent -in theory if not practice -relationship to non-intervention. Dominic Tierney's FDR and the Spanish Civil War: Neutrality and Commitment in the Struggle that Divided America (2007), and Brian Shelmerdine's British Representations of the Spanish Civil WarShelmerdine examines how British self-conceptions and perceptions of the intensely foreign 'Spaniards' shaped the general disposition towards the Civil War. The author sets out to trace the 'roots, nature and vigour' (2) of British views of Spain and its people in order to better understand the Anglo position between 1936 and 1939. Despite the people who went to Spain from England -as volunteers in the International brigades, foreign correspondents, or medi-556