Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy

Barry, Brian

doi:10.1017/s0007123400008322

Cited by 224 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…CAP offers the prime example, remaining the largest area of EU expenditure despite a decline in the importance of the agricultural sector and external pressures for reform. Each of those with a primary say in the decision -the 'iron triangle' of agricultural ministers, agriculture officials in the commission, and European farming interests -has a vested interest in supporting the other, while the costs of mobilising consumers against CAP is greater than the average cost to each taxpayer (Keeler 1996;Nedergaard 1995 can also give elites incentives to maximise rather than reduce their differences and to solidify group differences rather than allowing them to evolve or reduce (Barry 1975).…”

Section: Counter-majoritarianmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democracy without democracy? Can the EU's democratic ‘outputs’ be separated from the democratic ‘inputs’ provided by competitive parties and majority rule?

Bellamy¹

2010

Journal of European Public Policy

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Section: Counter-majoritarianmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democracy without democracy? Can the EU's democratic ‘outputs’ be separated from the democratic ‘inputs’ provided by competitive parties and majority rule?

Bellamy¹

2010

Journal of European Public Policy

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“…No law prohibits majority rule in the Federal Council. Reliance on some of the northern European models also attracts criticism (Barry 1975a;1975b) and suspicion lingers that these might not be viable in less prosperous and more deeply divided countries -such as Guyana, Iraq or Bosnia -where ministers from distinct communities are under greater popular pressure to play to a communal gallery.…”

Section: Power Sharing In Fiji Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Globalisation and Governance in the Pacific Islands : State, Society and Governance in Melanesia

Firth¹

2006

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“…New guarantees by the IRA, however, made the executive's re-establishment in May 2000 possible. 13 See also Lorwin (1971), Steiner (1974), Daalder (1974), Barry (1975aBarry ( , 1975b, Pappalardo (1981), Schmidt (1997: 233-236). 14 For a similar catalogue of favourable conditions, see Lijphart (1977Lijphart ( : 53-103, 1991.…”

Section: Favouring and Non-favouring Power-sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Making Power-sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation

Schneckener¹

2002

Journal of Peace Research

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For managing and settling ethnic conflicts, power-sharing arrangements often seem an appropriate solution. The former antagonists are forced to work together and make decisions by consensus; the ultimate goal is to turn opponents into partners. Obviously, this concept can only be successful under specific conditions and by specific arrangements. Based on a comparative analysis of six cases of power-sharing, the article aims (1) to identify favourable conditions as well as (2) to evaluate the quality of regulations. For successful conflict regulation, both aspects have to be taken into account: if the most favourable conditions are missing or will not be attained over time, then the `best' power-sharing constitution will fail. If, in turn, `bad' or insufficient rules and procedures prevail, then even the presence of comparatively beneficial factors will probably not avoid failure. Success will be understood as achievement and sustainability of a particular solution. The article is subdivided into four sections. First, the concept of power-sharing (or consociationalism) will be mapped out. Second, successful and failed European cases of power-sharing will be briefly presented. Third, by comparing these cases, the relevance of a set of conditions - usually assumed to be favourable for success - will be examined. Fourth, the quality of the institutional design of power-sharing regimes will be evaluated in order to distinguish `better' regulations from more problematic or even counterproductive ones. In concluding, the author points to the crucial role of political elites in sustaining shared rule, but stresses at the same time that in most cases their behaviour is shaped by the institutional arrangements themselves. These have to be designed in a way that supports and fosters learning processes among decisionmakers.

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Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy

Cited by 224 publications

References 11 publications

Democracy without democracy? Can the EU's democratic ‘outputs’ be separated from the democratic ‘inputs’ provided by competitive parties and majority rule?

Democracy without democracy? Can the EU's democratic ‘outputs’ be separated from the democratic ‘inputs’ provided by competitive parties and majority rule?

Globalisation and Governance in the Pacific Islands : State, Society and Governance in Melanesia

Making Power-sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation

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