Reversed Conditionality in EU External Migration Policy: The Case of Morocco

Abstract

Mobility partnerships between the European Union (EU) and third countries are usually viewed as reflecting asymmetric power relations where development aid, trade relations and visa policies are made conditional upon the cooperation by third countries with an EU agenda of migration control. Drawing on Cassarino's notion of 'reversed conditionality', this article advocates a more balanced view of EU-third country relations and argues that mobility partnerships are also instrumentalised as part of the domestic agendas of third countries. The argument is illustrated by an analysis of the case of EU-Morocco relations with a specific focus on the National Strategy for Immigration and Asylum in Morocco. The analysis illustrates how soft law instruments such as mobility partnerships have significant legal and political implications for third countries and can provide important external support for the development and implementation of national political priorities.

Bureaucratic Migration Politics in West Africa: Opportunities and Dependencies Created by EU Funding

“…In the process of policy formulation, bureaucracies also provide long-term institutional memory for policy orientations and shape future decisions (Ascher 2017;Paquet 2019). Different administrative units have control over specific dossiers and manage political actors' access to (and, thus, their ability to take part in) policy formulation (Paquet 2019, 168).…”

“…Cassarino's (2018, 407) description of the “proactive engagement of North African and Sahelian countries” with the EU reveals this perspective. Tittel-Mosser (2018, 353) even spoke of a “reversed conditionality” in which a non-EU country sets conditions for the EU. Along similar lines, Adam et al (2020, 3104) show how migration policy in West Africa has become an “intermestic” policy issue influenced by both domestic preferences and external actors.…”

“…Researchers studying the European Union's (EU) cooperation with African countries to regulate or control south-to-north migration have highlighted that African countries’ domestic preferences and politics often define the outcome of such negotiations (Vives 2017; El Qadim 2018; Cassarino 2018; Mouthaan 2019; Adam et al 2020; Fernández-Molina and De Larramendi 2020; Cham and Adam 2021; Ostrand and Statham 2021). Most studies on this topic have concentrated on the role of political actors, such as governments, with whom decision making and executive power mainly rest (e.g., Vives 2017; Cassarino 2018; Tittel-Mosser 2018). However, a relevant actor in understanding EU migration policy cooperation with countries of the Global South has been neglected by this specialized scholarship — bureaucrats within national administrations.…”

‘Street-level’ agents operating beyond ‘remote control’: how overseas liaison officers and foreign state officials shape UK extraterritorial migration management

“…2 In fact, our study shows extraterritorialisation efforts are not just between stronger and weaker states, but also occur between powerful states who have a more equal relationship, for example, when the UK established a liaison network in New York to combat 'unwanted' immigration from the Caribbean and Central and South America. With a few exceptions (FitzGerald 2019:101-122;Tittel-Mosser 2018;Wolff 2016), another problem is that agency is attributed almost exclusively to powerful destination states. 3 Thus Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen (2015:243) consider sending and transit states 'conscripted' … 'to effect migration control on behalf of the developed world'.…”

“…Specifically, she explains policy failures by 'the refusal of many foreign governments to cooperate in the control efforts of advanced democracies' (Ellermann 2008:169). In addition, Wolff (2016:89) finds domestic and regional politics in Turkey and Morocco importantly shaped their motivations to agree to readmission agreements: '(they) are not passive actors when confronted with the externalisation of border controls and are able to influence to some extent the EU' (see also Tittel-Mosser 2018).…”