Revenue sharing contracts of green fresh product considering freshness keeping effort

Wang, Guoli; Hao, Yujie; Chen, R.J.

doi:10.1007/s42488-023-00096-8

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…, where η * is expressed as Equation ( 5) or (8). Then, the retailer's profit function π r can be given by…”

Section: Appendix Amentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cao et al [7] consider the optimal pricing strategy and supplier freshness effort selection problem in a supply chain consisting of two suppliers and a retailer. Wang et al [8] consider the joint influence of the suppliers' preservation effort levels and the time required to transport the products on the freshness of the products, and further study the optimal preservation effort level and the optimal pricing cost-sharing contract in the centralized and decentralized supply chain, on the basis of considering the impact of freshness on consumer behavior. Gao et al [9] consider the effects of the freshness-keeping effort on the coordination of a fresh agricultural product supply chain.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimization of a Two-Echelon Supply Chain Considering Consumer Low-Carbon Preference

Ying

2023

Mathematics

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This paper considers a fresh food supply chain with a supplier who takes responsibility for the cold chain and a retailer who needs to reprocess the fresh food. Carbon emissions will be produced in the processes of production, transportation, processing, etc. We consider the four-stage game, obtain the function expressions of optimal market prices with respect to carbon emission reduction level (CERL), analyze the best responses of the supplier and the retailer regarding their CERLs, and obtain the 25 optimal CERLs under competitive equilibrium. In 24 of the 25 equilibrium cases, the supplier or the retailer either do nothing to reduce carbon emissions, or make the most effort to reduce carbon emissions. Excluding these special cases, we focused on a non-trivial case where the increasing consumer preferences for low-carbon products will encourage the supplier and the retailer to reduce carbon emissions. Interestingly, we find that when the consumer preference for low-carbon products is low, the retailer’s and supplier’s equilibrium carbon reduction levels are low, so that the potential market size is small such that the competition for two kinds of customers is fierce. Then, an increase in the sale cost will reduce the retail price. However, when the consumer preference for low-carbon products is high, the potential market size is large such that the competition is not fierce. Then, an increase in the sale cost will advance the retail price.

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“…, where η * is expressed as Equation ( 5) or (8). Then, the retailer's profit function π r can be given by…”

Section: Appendix Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimization of a Two-Echelon Supply Chain Considering Consumer Low-Carbon Preference

Ying

2023

Mathematics

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Benefit distribution of guaranteed water saving management contract based on principal-agent theory

Wang,

Li,

et al. 2024

International Journal of General Systems

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Designing robust green sustainable supply chain network by bi-objective optimization method

Gao,

Liu,

Liu

2023

International Journal of General Systems

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Revenue sharing contracts of green fresh product considering freshness keeping effort

Cited by 5 publications

References 30 publications

Optimization of a Two-Echelon Supply Chain Considering Consumer Low-Carbon Preference

Optimization of a Two-Echelon Supply Chain Considering Consumer Low-Carbon Preference

Benefit distribution of guaranteed water saving management contract based on principal-agent theory

Designing robust green sustainable supply chain network by bi-objective optimization method

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