Revenue royalties: comment

Martín, Marta San; Saracho, Ana I.

doi:10.1007/s00712-020-00721-9

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…A variety of market structures, competitive models, and information structure models have all been used to study technology licensing approaches by scholars (Wang & Yang, 1999;Wang, 2002;Sen, 2005;Sen & Tauman, 2007;Sen & Bhattacharya, 2017;Niu, 2018;Jeon, 2019;Hattori & Tanaka, 2018, 2021. Other factors that influence the optimal licensing contract include product differentiation (Li & Wang, 2010;Ye & Mukhopadhyay, 2013;Rau et al, 2019;Zou & Chen, 2020;Sen et al, 2021;San Martín & Saracho, 2021), the number of participants (Antelo & Sampayo, 2017), and network effects (Zhao et al, 2014;Zhang et al, 2018). However, in the studies mentioned above, licensing of green technologies has received far less consideration than licensing for manufacturing technologies.…”

Section: Technology Licensingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

Shang

Chen

2022

Technological and Economic Development of Economy

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This study investigates the green technology licensing strategies of firms with corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a duopoly market. The results show that in the absence of CSR, the optimal licensing contract is fixed-fee licensing for a patent holding firm. In the precent of CSR, the optimal licensing contract for a patent holding firm switches from fixed-fee licensing to royalty licensing with increasing level of CSR if the reduction cost of emissions is high. Moreover, we show that the profit goal of firm and the social welfare goal of government are not always mutually exclusive. If the level of CSR is low, a uniform licensing contract would be preferable. If the level of CSR is high, the optimal licensing contract is inconsistent. Finally, we show that CSR is not always beneficial to the social welfare while CSR benefits the environment. Social welfare benefits from increased CSR degree, but vice versa is true when CSR degree decreases. This research may provide valuable insights into licensing and CSR literature.

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Section: Technology Licensingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

Shang

Chen

2022

Technological and Economic Development of Economy

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“…What we claim is that, in the linear case, we can import some of the results obtained in the licensing literature dealing with constant marginal costs and product differentiation, to the licensing literature with increasing marginal costs and homogeneous goods. For example, San Martín and Saracho (2021) show that they can replicate the results in Colombo and Filippini (2016), in a setting with homogeneous goods and increasing marginal costs, using their results in San Martín and Saracho (2015), where differentiated goods with constant marginal costs are considered. In doing so, they identify some flaws in the proofs of Colombo and Filippini (2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly with increasing marginal costs

Faulí‐Oller

Sandonı́s

2022

The Manchester School

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We consider a symmetric homogeneous Cournot duopoly operating under increasing marginal costs. One of the firms owns a patented superior technology that reduces the intercept of the marginal cost function. We compare the incentives of the insider patentee to license the technology to the rival firm either through a fixed fee or through a royalty. We obtain that royalty licensing does not necessarily dominates in our setting: when decreasing returns are important, a royalty is superior only for small enough innovations, whereas a fixed fee is chosen for large innovations. Aditionally, we show that our model is able to replicate the results in Wang (2002), which analyzes the same question in a differentiated duopoly with constant marginal costs.

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Technology licensing under product differentiation

Sen

Kaul

Biswas

2021

J Econ

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This paper discusses the licensing of technology between rival firms in a Cournot duopoly with horizontal and vertical product differentiation. The firms produce products of different qualities (high and low) and incur different costs per unit of output produced. It is shown that technology is transferred from the firm that produces the higher quality product to the firm that produces the lower quality product via a fixed-fee if the quality difference (net of cost) and the horizontal differentiation between the two products are relatively low. Technology is transferred through royalty, for any level of quality difference (net of cost), if the horizontal differentiation between the products is relatively low. A similar result is observed for twopart tariff licensing and quota licensing, which is a combination of output quota set by the licensor coupled with a fixed-fee. It is also shown that the optimal form of contract is either two-part tariff licensing or quota licensing. Technology is never licensed from the firm that produces a lower quality product to its rival that produces a higher quality product. However, the cross-licensing of technology is sometimes possible. After licensing welfare always increases.

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Revenue royalties: comment

Cited by 4 publications

References 2 publications

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly with increasing marginal costs

Technology licensing under product differentiation

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