Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007
DOI: 10.1145/1250910.1250918
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Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions

Abstract: Keyword auctions lie at the core of the business models of today's leading search engines. Advertisers bid for placement alongside search results, and are charged for clicks on their ads. Advertisers are typically ranked according to a score that takes into account their bids and potential clickthrough rates. We consider a family of ranking rules that contains those typically used to model Yahoo! and Google's auction designs as special cases. We find that in general neither of these is necessarily revenue-opti… Show more

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Cited by 131 publications
(123 citation statements)
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“…whenever a user clicks on an ad in position k, the advertiser pays an amount equal to the minimum bid needed to secure that position (Lahaie et al 2007). After clicking on the ad, the consumer is redirected to the advertiser's website, and then chooses whether to purchase a product or register for a service (which we define as conversions).…”
Section: Sponsored Searchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…whenever a user clicks on an ad in position k, the advertiser pays an amount equal to the minimum bid needed to secure that position (Lahaie et al 2007). After clicking on the ad, the consumer is redirected to the advertiser's website, and then chooses whether to purchase a product or register for a service (which we define as conversions).…”
Section: Sponsored Searchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They established the existence of a Nash equilibrium which also satisfies other desirable stability properties such as being welfare-maximizing and envy-free. A further analysis of envy-free Nash equilibria, by taking into account the quality factor of the advertisers was also provided in [16].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These auctions are common in online advertising (see Varian (2006Varian ( , 2009 and Edelman et al (2007)), though they are not necessarily revenue-optimizing (see Lahaie and Pennock (2007) and Myerson (1981)). For general information on auction mechanisms, refer to Milgrom (2004) or Krishna (2002).…”
Section: How Selection Bias Impacts Display Auction Revenuementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some advertisers pay when the ad is shown, others pay only when showing the ad elicits a user response such as a click or a purchase. (For details on auctions for online advertising, refer to Varian (2006Varian ( , 2009, Edelman et al (2007), and Lahaie and Pennock (2007). )…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%