Revelation and physicalism

Abstract

According to experiential revelation, phenomenal concepts reveal the nature of the phenomenal properties they refer to. Some see experiential revelation as posing a direct challenge to physicalism. The basic idea is this: given experiential revelation, were phenomenal properties physical/functional in nature they would be presented as such when you think of them under phenomenal concepts, but phenomenal concepts don't present their referents in this way. I argue that, while this argument on a plausible reconstruction fails, the thesis of experiential revelation nevertheless indirectly challenges physicalism. In particular, it potentially undermines the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, a key defense maneuver of the physicalist for responding to dualist arguments concerning experience. The moral is that issues concerning revelation do indeed pose a problem for physicalism, but not for the reasons you might think.

New frontiers in ground, essence, and modality: introduction

“…The broadly Finean notion of essence (and related notions such as Lowe's identity dependence) has been put to work in various areas of philosophy, such as the following: in characterizing and critically discussing ontic structural realism (Wolff 2012;French 2014;McKenzie 2014;Ó Conaill 2014) and mathematical structuralism (Linnebo 2008); in arguments against priority monism (Lowe 2012b; Tallant 2015); and in discussions of revelation, the thesis that we can come to know the essence of phenomenal properties by attending to our own experiences (Goff 2015;Trogdon 2017). One of the most prominent applications of essence has been in the literature on ground.…”

Phenomenal Experience and the Thesis of Revelation

“…Discussions on the idea of revelation can be traced to Descartes (1985: 215-7) in his writings on the notion of a clear and distinct idea, and Hume (2000: 136) in the Treatise. 1 One can also find contemporary discussions on revelation in relation to the topic of phenomenal experience and the physicalist-dualist debate about the nature of consciousness (Strawson, 1989; Lewis, 1995;Nida-Rümelin, 2007;Stoljar, 2006Stoljar, , 2009Damnjanovic, 2012;Goff, 2015Goff, , 2017Majeed, 2017;Trogdon, 2017).…”

“…More recently, Philip Goff (2015 has appealed to the thesis of revelation to argue against physicalism. Of course, whether there is an incompatibility between revelation and physicalism, and how this incompatibility is to be understood provided that there is one, depends on how we cash out revelation and physicalism (see Damnjanovic, 2012;Trogdon, 2017;Stoljar, 2018).…”

“…Regarding the former, one might dispute the force of the argument from revelation against physicalism. For instance, one might query whether the argument proves that all versions of physicalism are false; one might also argue that revelation is in fact implausible (see Damnjanovic, 2012;Trogdon, 2017;Stoljar, 2018). With respect to the intuitiveness of revelation, one might question whether revelation is in fact intuitive or part of the ordinary conception of experience as is often claimed (see Stoljar, 2009).…”

Powerful Qualities, Phenomenal Concepts, and the New Challenge to Physicalism

“…However, I will briefly note that my view has the advantage of answering the new challenge. SeeTrogdon [2016] for a critical discussion of constitution views.…”