Revealing the Architectural Design Patterns in the Volumetric DDoS Defense Design Space

Abstract

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have plagued the Internet for decades. Despite the ever-increasing investments into mitigation solution development, DDoS attacks continue to grow with ever-increasing frequency and magnitude. To identify the root cause of the above-observed trend, in this paper, we conduct a systematic and architectural evaluation of volumetric DDoS detection and mitigation efforts over 24,000 papers, articles, and RFCs over 30+ years. To that end, we introduce a novel approach for systematizing comparisons of DDoS research, resulting in a comprehensive examination of the DDoS literature. Our analysis illustrates a small set of common design patterns across seemingly disparate solutions, and reveals insights into deployment traction and success of DDoS solutions. Furthermore, we discuss economic incentives and the lack of harmony between synergistic but independent approaches for detection and mitigation. As expected, defenses with a clear cost/benefit rationale are more prevalent than those that require extensive infrastructure changes. Finally, we discuss the lessons learned which we hope can shed light on future directions that can potentially turn the tide of the war against DDoS.