Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma

Cox, Caleb; Jones, Matthew T.; Pflum, Kevin E.; Healy, Paul J.

doi:10.1007/s00199-015-0863-1

Cited by 19 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…There is also a literature that has investigated finitely repeated interaction of social dilemmas, where coordination problems can emerge either in the presence of behavioral types of individuals (Cox et al, 2015) or when individuals have social preferences (Chen et al, 2014). By contrast, in our design individuals are assumed identical and self-interested, and coordination problems emerge because of the indefinite horizon of interaction.…”

Section: Related Experimental Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games

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Casari

2017

Exp Econ

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Does monitoring past conduct facilitate intertemporal cooperation? We designed an experiment characterized by strategic uncertainty and multiple equilibria where coordinating on the efficient outcome is a challenge. Participants, interacting anonymously in a group, could pay a cost either to obtain information about their counterparts, or to create a freely available public record of individual conduct. Both monitoring institutions were actively employed. However, groups were unable to attain higher levels of cooperation compared to a treatment without monitoring. Information about past conduct alone thus appears to be ineffective in overcoming coordination challenges.

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Section: Related Experimental Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games

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Casari

2017

Exp Econ

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“…10 Several recent papers (Mao et al (2017); Schneider & Weber (2013); Kagel & McGee (2016); Cox et al (2015); Kamei & Putterman (2015)) study heterogeneity in cooperative behavior and the role of reputation building in the finitely repeated PD. In Online Appendix A.1, we also include a discussion of these papers.…”

Section: The Meta-studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

2015

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More than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience-as suggested by backward induction-remains inconclusive. This paper provides a metaanalysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how cooperation varies with the environment in this canonical game. We describe forces that affect initial play (formation of cooperation) and unraveling (breakdown of cooperation). First, contrary to the backward induction prediction, the parameters of the repeated game have a significant effect on initial cooperation. We identify how these parameters impact the value of cooperation-as captured by the size of the basin of attraction of Always Defect-to account for an important part of this effect. Second, despite these initial differences, the evolution of behavior is consistent with the unraveling logic of backward induction for all parameter combinations. Importantly, despite the seemingly contradictory results across studies, this paper establishes a systematic pattern of behavior: subjects converge to use threshold strategies that conditionally cooperate until a threshold round; and conditional on establishing cooperation, the first defection round moves earlier with experience. Simulation results generated from a learning model estimated at the subject level provide insights into the long-term dynamics and the forces that slow down the unraveling of cooperation.

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“…In contrast to this, there is some cooperation in end round play for both teams (9.8%) and individuals (26.9%), with this difference significant at the 5% level. 12 Cooperation in the last round of play is sometimes treated as evidence for altruism in the population, typically reciprocal altruists committed to TFT play (Andreoni and Miller, 1993;Cox et al, 2012).…”

Section: 1 Comparing Patterns Of Play Between Individuals and Teamsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games

Kagel

McGee

2016

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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In finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, two-person teams start out with significantly less cooperation than individuals, consistent with results reported in the social psychology literature.However, this quickly gives way to teams cooperating significantly more than individuals. Team dialogues show significant discrepancies between beliefs and those underlying leading "rational" cooperation models. Cooperation is sustained by its higher payoff in conjunction with limited unraveling due to teams (and by implication individuals) failure to account for others planning to defect earlier based on past experience, much as they do, which is consistent with boundedly rational thinking.

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Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma

Cited by 19 publications

References 55 publications

Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games

Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games

Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games

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