RETRACTED ARTICLE: Explaining the gap between online violent extremism and offline inaction among far right groups: a study of Action Zealandia from 2019 to 2021

Alt‐right gangs and far‐right extremists: From the margins to the mainstream

“…), play racist video games, listen to white power music, and even indoctrinate children (Belew, 2018; Daniels, 2009; Simi & Futrell, 2006, 2015). Traditionally, far‐right groups were relegated to niche online communities, such as The Daily Stormer , Stormfront , or Iron March , restricting their rhetoric and worldview to Alt‐Tech echo chambers (see Daniels, 2018; Donovan et al., 2022; Perry & Scrivens, 2019; Reid & Valasik, 2020b; Scrivens, 2021; Sunderland, 2022; Winter 2019). Over the last decade, the proliferation of social media platform usage and the ubiquity of the Internet accelerated far‐right groups, particularly alt‐right gangs, to asymmetrically extend their reach to mainstream audiences making white power content readily available and shareable without individuals needing to seek it out (Donovan et al., 2022; Hawley, 2021; Lewis, 2018; Miller‐Idriss, 2020; Paxton, 2018).…”

“…Yet, it was not until after the January 6th Insurrection, three and a half years later, that serious attention finally began to be paid to these far‐right groups (GWPOE, 2022; Jensen, 2022; Nance, 2022; Valasik & Reid, 2021a). Similarly, alt‐right gangs have emerged, persisted, and been discounted by law enforcement in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and throughout Europe (see Blazak, 2022; Gilbert & Elley, 2020; Hermansson et al., 2020; Kutner, 2020; Miller‐Idriss, 2020; Perry et al., 2022; Wilson & Halpin, 2022). Currently, there is an inflection point in how academia and the broader criminal justice apparatus understands and handles far‐right groups, specifically alt‐right gangs.…”

Us vs. Them: A Subcultural Analysis of Violent Extremism within New Zealand’s Telegram Conspiracy Community

“…Whether or not users genuinely intended to act upon their violent threats, these violent expressions earned them status and approval within the community for their perceived willingness to act and their commitment to the community's ideals. The attraction of status likely incentivised others to engage in similarly violent rhetoric to advertise their adherence and commitment to the community's beliefs and willingness to act in its defence (Maratea & Kavanaugh, 2012;Simi & Windisch, 2020;Wilson and Halpin, 2022). This provides evidence to support the NZSIS's (2022a) concern that "the volume and normalisation of violent rhetoric online could radicalise individuals who were not previously on the violent extremist spectrum" (p. 24).…”

“…At the simplest level, the threshold for expressing moral outrage and making threats online is low and has generally few consequences (Wilson and Halpin, 2022). The relative anonymity of online spaces may also allow extremist individuals to express their true selves and views that they would otherwise keep hidden within their day-to-day lives (Maratea & Kavanaugh, 2012).…”

“…Furthermore, the frequency of an individual's participation in an online community symbolizes their loyalty, attachment, and social status within and to the extremist group (Maratea & Kavanaugh, 2012). Additionally, expressing violent or extreme views within an online group can bring about a reputational reward, gaining respect and status from their peers (Wilson & Halpin, 2022). However, talking big to gain status and in-group acceptance by no means reduces the danger of this violent talk, as "those members who post most frequently and emotively play a central role in establishing what is valued within the group" (Davies et al, 2022, p.270).…”