Retirement Return Migration from Sweden

Abstract

This study deals with return migration among immigrants in Sweden who are between 51 and 80 years old. An important question regards the impact of retirement on return migration. Some circumstances connected to the withdrawal from the labour market suggest an increased propensity to return, such as the transition from a wage income to a pension, which weakens the link between place of residence and income. In addition, patterns of return migration at the end of working life may indicate whether or not temporary migration is a planned strategy. It is found that when reaching the age of 65, the legal retirement age in Sweden, the probability of return migration increases, in particular for men. The effect of retirement is immediate; the probability of return migration declines again beyond the age of 65, indicating a conscious plan to return to the home country when the labour market career is over.Furthermore, immigrants who receive early retirement compensation have a considerably higher probability of return migration compared to those who are not retired. These clear "retirement effects" show that return migration can be an important ingredient in the welfare optimization strategies of migrants. When it comes to income selectivity, the analysis shows that there is a positive selection, something that is expected when migrants are target savers with a temporary migration strategy. 154Klinthäll

Risk of prostate cancer among Swedish‐born and foreign‐born men in Sweden, 1961–2004

“…It is less probable for immigrants from other countries; however, such as Iran, Iraq and Poland to return to their home countries, mostly due to better health care and welfare benefits in Sweden and due to unstable political and economical situations in their birth countries. 44 Lack of information on individual risk factors, the clinical stage and histological grade, and true incidence of prostate cancer in most countries of origin are weaknesses of our study. Because immigrants are not representative of the total population in the country of origin, caution must be taken when comparing incidence rates among immigrants with those of the country of origin.…”

“…Selective return migration may also have influenced our results, especially for migrants from the USA and several European countries such as Scandinavian countries. 44 These immigrants are more likely to return to their countries of origin in case of cancer or after retirement. It is less probable for immigrants from other countries; however, such as Iran, Iraq and Poland to return to their home countries, mostly due to better health care and welfare benefits in Sweden and due to unstable political and economical situations in their birth countries.…”

Labor market outcomes, savings accumulation, and return migration

“…Even when it is optimal to There exist few studies that empirically test the conjectures rationalizing return migration. These few exceptions are Klinthall (1999), who finds no evidence for the savings accumulation motive for Greek migrants in Sweden, and a recent paper by Yang (2006).…”

Engines of growth: essays in Swedish economic history

“…21 While the Tabular Commission data contains information on several thousand unique geographical units (including härader, församlingar, pastorat, and tingslag) these are highly unbalanced. To reduce concerns that areas that grew rapidly became more likely to enter the data over time, the main sample used in the analysis focuses on a balanced set of parishes, which results in 608 consistently defined rural parishes observed at five-year intervals between 1750 and 1850.…”

“…Table 2 shows that about 10 percent of the population had voting rights in the average municipality, though the sample spans municipalities where less than one percent was allowed to vote to those where more than one in four had voting rights. 21 To measure the distribution of political power among vote holders, we use the fact that each municipality also reported the number of voters that held respectively 5-10, 10-25, and >25 percent of all votes. 22 To define local elites we identify municipalities in which individual voters held a disproportionate share of a municipality's total votes.…”