Rethinking the ontology of the shareholder model of the corporation

Abstract

Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to examine the critical assumptions lying behind the Anglo American model of corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach -Literature review examining the concept of a nexus of contracts underpinning agency theory which, it is argued, act as the platform for neo-liberal corporate governance focusing on shareholder wealth creation. Findings -The paper highlights the unaddressed critical challenge of why eighteenth century ownership structures are readily adopted in the twenty-first century. Social implications -A re-examination of wealth creation and wealth redistribution. Originality/value -The paper is highly original due to the fact that few contributions have been made in the area of rethinking shareholder value.

Firm ownership structure impact on corporate social responsibility: evidence from austerity U.K.

“…The focus of corporate governance mechanisms has traditionally prioritised the maximizing of shareholders economic value (Freidman, 1962;Williamson, 1975;Kakabadse et al, 2013) more than environmental protection and social sustainability. Within the originating economies of Anglo-American capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001;Aguliera and Crespi-Cladera, 2015) progressive governments' increasingly neo-liberal financial policies (Kinderman, 2012;Heyes et al, 2012) as innovations, have supported the rapid growth of an elite cadre of corporate entities (Vitali et al, 2011).…”

Game of Regional Environmental Policy: Europe and US

“…In this respect, scholars of comparative governance (van Essen et al 2013; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003) environmental and consumer regulation (Vogel, 2003); federal fiscal structures (Henning and Kessler, 2012); lobbying (Coen, 1999); corporate social responsibility (Matten and Moon, 2008); and even organisational scandals (Soltani, 2013) debate the salient diversity / convergence between the Continental European and neo-liberal Anglo-American capitalistic models (Kakabadse et al 2013). The notion of European integration and globalisation (Farazmand, 1999) are often differently understood by national policy makers within the supranational entity of Europe (Hay and Rosamond, 2002).…”

Company secretary: a role of breadth and majesty

“…Whilst the focus of institutional governance is on building risk-resilience capacities against volatile and chaotic market impacts (Kakabadse, 2015; Boussebaa et al , 2012), the firm leadership priority remains more towards how the Board should be structured and engaged to achieve better investor value (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) from their committees and top-team members (Filatotchev and Dotsenko, 2015, Ferrero-Ferrero et al , 2015; Krause et al , 2014). But the narrowly conceived (Kakabadse et al , 2013; Freeman et al , 2007) shorter-term institution–firm relationships reorientation has yet to effectively address the longer-term policy-strategy sustainability[3] concern as supporting societal value (Boughlet et al , 2016; Parker and Tamaschke, 2005; Griffin and Mahone, 1997).…”