Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning

Soames, Scott

doi:10.1515/9781400866335

Cited by 91 publications

(71 citation statements)

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“…In the book I argue for this in basically three steps. 7 See especially Fine (2007); Salmon (2012); Soames (2015). 8 Though I don't want to exaggerate my originality here; as noted in the book, my views on these topics are very much indebted to Johnston (2004).…”

Section: Objects Kinds and Indiscriminable Phenomenal Differencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Speaks

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Section: Objects Kinds and Indiscriminable Phenomenal Differencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Speaks

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…Intuitively, it is possible that the truth values of the sentences (9) and (10) differ; in particular, it can be the case that (9) is true while (10) is false (see Soames, , ch. 2; King, , p. 107).…”

Section: The “Logicism”/“that Arithmetic Is Reducible To Logic” Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Names of Truth Bearers, and “That”‐Clauses: A Dilemma for Millians

Bonardi

2017

Theoria

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Millianism is the doctrine according to which the semantic content of a proper name is exhausted by its referent. This article raises and attempts to solve a dilemma for Millians: either a proper name of a truth bearer is in turn a truth bearer (which seems inadmissible); or having a truth bearer as semantic content is not sufficient for a linguistic expression to be a truth bearer (but then what is required for such a purpose?). As it will be shown in the manuscript, the dilemma does not arise with "that"-clauses in the place of proper names, if "that"-clauses are taken to be non-Millian designators whose semantic content is not a truth bearer. An account of "that"clauses having such features and originating with Salmon, Frege's Puzzle, will be defended.

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“…But I can say the same thing again -here I go: 2 plus 2 equals 4. I just performed two distinct historical acts of saying, 1 See Jubien (2001), Moltmann (2003), Soames (2010aSoames ( , 2010bSoames ( , 2015, Hanks (2007Hanks ( , 2011Hanks ( , 2015. For a discussion of this approach in relation to its historical sources and predecessors (including Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment and Husserl's theory of propositional contents as "species"), see Moltmann & Textor (2017), pp.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth-Bearers in Frege and the Tractatus

Bronzo

2019

Analiza I Egzystencja

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Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning

Cited by 91 publications

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Names of Truth Bearers, and “That”‐Clauses: A Dilemma for Millians

Truth-Bearers in Frege and the Tractatus

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