Rethinking Epistemic Relativism

Abstract

“Relativism” is often treated as a dirty word in philosophy, but relativistic theories are not entirely unappealing—they have features that might be tempting if they weren't thought to be outweighed by problematic consequences. The aim of this paper is to rethink both our attitude to epistemic relativism and the basic features of the view itself. The paper discusses four objections and uses them to isolate five constraints on a more plausible epistemic relativism. It then sketches out a view that meets all of these constraints. This stratified epistemic relativism offers a complex, socially informed picture of justification that accounts for the many different kinds of roles that epistemic agents act, and think, in accordance with each day, and can serve as a starting point for constructing a more detailed epistemic relativism, which could secure its appealing benefits without incurring the costs traditionally associated with relativist views.

Can hinge epistemology close the door on epistemic relativism?

“…In this way, the scope and force of this paper is admittedly modest: if one thinks that relativism should be avoided, and that we cannot easily do so with the acceptance and non-doxastic accounts of hinges taken 35 I thank an anonymous referee of this journal for inviting me to clarify this point. 36 For philosophers sympathetic both to hinge epistemology and epistemic relativism, see Ashton (2019;forthcoming) and Kusch (2016a;2017a). independently, then I have offered reasons to believe that epistemic relativism is kept at bay once we realize that given our commitment to avoid self-deception in our epistemic practices, we are in a position to rationally persuade and be persuaded that a given epistemic system is not on the right track.…”

Em que medida Wittgenstein seria fundacionista?

“…Está para além do escopo deste artigo expor minha análise de suas estratégias, porém expresso que minha posicao é a de que o relativismo epistêmico não precisa ser evitado, mas sim repensado. Para interpretações relativistas de Sobre a Certeza e da hinge epistemology, confira Kusch (2016) e Ashton (2019). compreendemos que a saída de Wittgenstein ao trilema de Agripa seria a recusa do trilema.…”