Resurrecting Biological Essentialism

Devitt, Michael

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280803.003.0012

Cited by 45 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 147 publications

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“…Apart from this work's growing prominence in the philosophy of science (see below), I simply note the broader engagement with essentialism to which it contributes, including questioning the adequacy of what historians of biology call “the essentialism story” in their field (Amundson ; Winsor ); the resurrection of essentialism about species in the philosophy of biology (Devitt ); and the articulation of psychological essentialism in cognitive science and its putative implications for anthropology (Gil‐White ).…”

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confidence: 99%

Kinship Past, Kinship Present: Bio-Essentialism in the Study of Kinship

Wilson

2016

American Anthropologist

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In this article, I reconsider bio-essentialism in the study of kinship, centering on David Schneider's influential critique that concluded that kinship was "a non-subject" (1972:51). Schneider's critique is often taken to have shown the limitations of and problems with past views of kinship based on biology, genealogy, and reproduction, a critique that subsequently led those reworking kinship as relatedness in the new kinship studies to view their enterprise as divorced from such bio-essentialist studies. Beginning with an alternative narrative connecting kinship past and present and concluding by introducing a novel way of thinking about kinship, I have three constituent aims in this research article: (1) to reconceptualize the relationship between kinship past and kinship present; (2) to reevaluate Schneider's critique of bio-essentialism and what this implies for the contemporary study of kinship; and (3) subsequently to redirect theoretical discussion of what kinship is. This concluding discussion introduces a general view, the homeostatic property cluster (HPC) view of kinds, into anthropology, providing a theoretical framework that facilitates realization of the often-touted desideratum of the integration of biological and social features of kinship.[bio-essentialism, kinship studies, homeostatic property cluster kinds, Schneider, genealogy] ABSTRAIT Cet article reconsidère le bio-essentialisme dans l'étude de la parenté, en mettant l'accent sur la critique influente de David Schneider soutenant que la parenté est un «non-sujet» (1972:51). La critique de Schneider est souvent considérée comme ayant démontré les limites des conceptions de la parenté fondées sur la biologie, la généalogie et la reproduction. Dans les nouvellesétudes de la parenté, cette critique a conduit ceux qui travaillent sur la parenté conç ue comme apparentementà présenter leur entreprise commeétant opposée auxétudes bio-essentialistes. Commenç ant avec un récit reliant parenté passée et présente et offrant une nouvelle faç on de penser la parenté, cet article a trois objectifs cardinaux: (1) redéfinir la relation entre la parenté passée et la parenté présente, (2) réévaluer la critique par Schneider du bio-essentialisme et ce qu'il implique pour l'étude contemporaine de la parenté, et (3) enfin réorienter la discussion théorique de ce qu'est la parenté. Cette discussion se termine par l'introduction en anthropologie d'un schème conceptuel -le groupement de propriétés homéostatiques (GPH) vue de catégories naturelles -fournissant un cadre théorique pour l'intégration tant recherchée des car- RESUMEN Este artículo reconsidera el esencialismo biológico (bio-esencialismo) en el estudio del parentesco, centrándose en la influyente crítica de David Schneider. A menudo se considera que la crítica de Schneider ha demostrado los problemas y las limitaciones de teorías del parentesco anteriores, basadas en la biología, la genealogía y la reproducción. Su crítica contribuyó a que aquellos que trabajaban el parentesco como afinidad ("...

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confidence: 99%

Kinship Past, Kinship Present: Bio-Essentialism in the Study of Kinship

Wilson

2016

American Anthropologist

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“…The more serious problem of the alternative of re-creation is that it does not seem to be consistent with any species concept presented. Phenetic species concepts would demand that Delia be classified with Celia, but phenetic concepts-wherein species membership is defined by the instantiation of individually necessary or jointly sufficient properties-treat species as natural kinds (Devitt 2008;Ereshefsky 2010). If kind has members, then it most certainly exists; if Delia is member of C. pyrenaica pyrenaica and if C. pyrenaica pyrenaica is natural kind, then that subspecies must be extant.…”

Section: Iv2 Second Alternative: Re-creationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Extinction and De-Extinction of Species

Siipi

Finkelman

2016

Philos. Technol.

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“…57 In more rigorous discourse, biological essentialism, in a supposed Aristotelian sense, refers to something elsewhat is not without ambiguity. Whatever it is, as Devitt (2008) notes, there is a consensus against it. But what precisely is being repudiated?…”

Section: Iii-c Thin Biological Racial Essentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Nature of Race: the Genealogy of the Concept and the Biological Construct’s Contemporaneous Utility

Fuerst¹

2015

OBG

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Racial constructionists, anti-naturalists, and anti-realists have challenged users of the biological race concept to provide and defend, from the perspective of biology, biological philosophy, and ethics, a biologically informed concept of race. In this paper, an ontoepistemology of biology is developed. What it is, by this, to be "biological real" and "biologically meaningful" and to represent a "biological natural division" is explained. Early 18th century race concepts are discussed in detail and are shown to be both sensible and not greatly dissimilar to modern concepts. A general biological race concept (GBRC) is developed. It is explained what the GBRC does and does not entail and how this concept unifies the plethora of specific ones, past and present. Other race concepts as developed in the philosophical literature are discussed in relation to the GBRC. The sense in which races are both real and natural is explained. Racial essentialism of the relational sort is shown to be coherent. Next, the GBRC is discussed in relation to anthropological discourse. Traditional human racial classifications are defended from common criticisms: historical incoherence, arbitrariness, cluster discordance, etc. Whether or not these traditional human races could qualify as taxa subspeciesor even speciesis considered. It is argued that they could qualify as taxa subspecies by liberal readings of conventional standards. Further, it is pointed out that some species concepts potentially allow certain human populations to be designated as species. It is explained why, by conventional population genetic and statistical standards, genetic differences between major human racial groups are at least moderate. Behavioral genetic differences associated with human races are discussed in general and in specific. The matter of race differences in cognitive ability is briefly considered. Finally, the race concept is defended from various criticisms. First, logical and empirical critiques are dissected. These include: biological scientific, sociological, ontological, onto-epistemological, semantic, and teleological arguments. None are found to have any merit. Second, moral-based arguments are investigated in context to a general ethical frame and are counter-critiqued. Racial inequality, racial nepotism, and the "Racial Worldview" are discussed. What is dubbed the Anti-Racial Worldview is rejected on both empirical and moral grounds. Finally, an area of future investigationthe politics of the destruction of the race conceptis pointed to.

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Resurrecting Biological Essentialism

Cited by 45 publications

References 147 publications

Kinship Past, Kinship Present: Bio-Essentialism in the Study of Kinship

Kinship Past, Kinship Present: Bio-Essentialism in the Study of Kinship

The Extinction and De-Extinction of Species

The Nature of Race: the Genealogy of the Concept and the Biological Construct’s Contemporaneous Utility

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