2015
DOI: 10.3765/salt.v0i0.2531
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Restrictions on the Meaning of Determiners: Typological Generalisations and Learnability

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 7 publications
(9 reference statements)
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“…However, the structure of this distribution, which reflects cognitive biases, might be restricted in ways that shorten time to convergence. For example, if certain structures are unlearnable (as discussed in, e.g., Hunter, Lidz, Wellwood, & Conroy, 2010;Pinker & Jackendoff, 2009), then the number of possible languages is effectively decreased, lowering time to convergence.…”
Section: Future Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the structure of this distribution, which reflects cognitive biases, might be restricted in ways that shorten time to convergence. For example, if certain structures are unlearnable (as discussed in, e.g., Hunter, Lidz, Wellwood, & Conroy, 2010;Pinker & Jackendoff, 2009), then the number of possible languages is effectively decreased, lowering time to convergence.…”
Section: Future Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To concretize the problem, suppose that the end result of understanding There are more apples than bananas is the LoT expression “A > B” and that of There is more sand than mud is “S > M.” Specifically, what's required is a specification of (i) how the single symbol “>” (Wellwood, 2019) can be interpreted by cognitive systems operating both over domains representing pluralities of objects and those representing stuff (Odic, Pietroski, Hunter, Lidz, & Halberda, 2012; see Rips & Hespos, 2015), and (ii) the logical relationships that an LoT expression enters into by virtue of being built around this symbol in a certain way (e.g., via proof-theoretic inference rules). We have suggested (Hunter & Wellwood, 2023) that for a nonlinguistic system to interpret a symbol such as “>” in the appropriate way is exactly for this interpretation to abide by some algebraic laws that are, in effect, specified by some inference rules governing expressions built out of “>.” For example, a rule licensing a logical inference from “A > B” and “B > C” to “A > C” essentially specifies that, in each content domain where “>” has an interpretation, that interpretation must correspond to a transitive binary relation.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…6.2, para. 5), is to suppose that the outputs of (specifically linguistic) language comprehension simply are LoT expressions (e.g., Hunter & Wellwood, 2023; Wellwood, 2020). On the contrary, the pathway from associationistic learning episodes to such representations is rather less direct.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%