Restricted Coasean Bargaining

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe investigate the efficiency of Coasean bargaining when restrictions are placed on the set of feasible bargaining outcomes. When property rights are costly to (defend) appropriate, we find bargaining restrictions may be Pareto superior to unconstrained voluntary exchange. Under cost uncertainty over the externality, we show an efficient configuration of restrictions must balance the potential reduction in appropriation costs with the possibility of allocatively inefficient bargaining restrictions. For cases where the restrictions are contested, we show conditions for the continuing existence of welfare improvements.

Pre-negotiation commitment and internalization in public good provision through bilateral negotiations

“…This leads to excessive provision of the public good. 19 Therefore, the supplier provides the public good efficiently if and only if its bargaining power is sufficiently weak, such that the cost of g(n) is compensated by all consumers, but not by fewer than n consumers.…”

“…Finally, we prove that the supplier's payoff is maximized at g = g(n). Since g(n) ∈ [g n , g n ) from (19), then given that the number of contributors is n, the suppliers' payoff is maximized at g = g(n). Thus, (20) and (22) imply that the supplier's payoff when the number of contributors belongs to N 1 ∪ N 3 is less than π n S (g(n)).…”

Coasean bargaining in the presence of Pigouvian taxation

“…Our results continue to hold if the proportional reduction in rent shares are the same across the tax and non-tax cases. For analysis on restrictions to the externality domain see MacKenzie and Ohndorf (2013b). rents acquired by the winning players X and Y are given by…”

A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation

“…(König et al, 2017) theoretically and empirically demonstrates the importance of the network structure of conflicts among groups in the Second Congo War. One may also expect that the structure of a contest network has important implications in other settings, including distributional conflicts in a federation as in (Wärneryd, 1998), lobbying for discretionary spending of top managers as in (Inderst et al, 2007), and appropriation of property rights as in (MacKenzie and Ohndorf, 2013).…”