Restorative justice in the Basque peace process: some experiments and their lessons

Leadership Styles and War and Peace Policies in the Spanish–Basque Conflict: A Discourse Analysis of José María Aznar and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero

“…Before moving on to analyze the war (Table 6) and peace (Table 7) policies implemented by Aznar and Zapatero to tackle the Basque conflict from 1996 to 2011, it should be recalled that leaders with suspicious style (Aznar) should be more prone to prioritizing the former over the latter in accordance with leadership styles theory (Walker 1990;Burke and Greenstein 1991;Byman and Pollack 2001;Conway et al 2001;Hermann 2003;Dyson 2006). During his first years in office, Aznar took the same hard line (Barros et al 2009) as his predecessor Felipe González (PSOE): continuing with the same dispersion policy as before, according to which ETA inmates were imprisoned far from home to prevent them from communicating among themselves (Zernova 2017); intense police action that not only affected the members of ETA, but also journalists, activists and political leaders in the organization's "orbit" (Linstroth 2002); and hindering judicial inquiries into the activities of the Antiterrorist Liberation Groups (GAL), a clandestine organization linked to the Spanish government, which had kidnapped and extra-judicially executed a number of ETA militants (González 1996, 3 August).…”

“…Subsequently, and in light of the peace of mind afforded by the absolute majority obtained in the 2000 elections and the favorable international climate after the 11-S attacks, Aznar took an even harder line with ETA through the passing of a new criminal legislation which had the support of the PSOE. For instance, as Zernova (2017) recalls, the Spanish parliament endorsed the bill to increase the number of days that those arrested for terrorist activities could be held in custody in solitary confinement, requested the judiciary that these types of offenders serve the full term, and reduced the scope of the so-called "prison benefits". By the same token, the legal definition of "terrorism" was broadened to include the kale borroka, collaboration with terrorist groups and the glorification of terrorism (Revenga Sánchez 2005).…”

“…All this was achieved with the explicit support of the EU, which drew up a list of "terrorists" including members and organizations of the Basque pro-independence left which had not taken up arms (Bourne 2003). These legal amendments resulted in a rise in the number of people arrested for terrorism-related crimes, many of whom had nothing to do with the armed conflict, as well as leading to the closure of media outlets and organizations of a political nature (Barros et al 2009;Zernova 2017).…”

“…This came on 20 October 2011, a month before the PP had won the general elections. This process ended up being unilateral, thanks to the aforementioned grassroots pressure, Zapatero's lack of time and interest and the inflexibility of his successor Rajoy (Eguiguren and Aizpeolea 2011;Zernova 2017). 20 Undoubtedly the most notorious case during those years was that involving Iñaki de Juana Chaos.…”

“…8 The third-the 11-S attacks and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq-gave Aznar the extra (international) justification that he needed to apply stricter counterterrorism measures. The support of the United States, the coinciding Spanish EU presidency and a heightened awareness of terrorism provoked by the attacks enabled the Spanish government to tighten up the country's legislation on political violence, without practically any opposition (Zernova 2017). In parallel, the Spanish press also spread false rumors about the links between al-Qaida and ETA, which the Basque organization denied in several communiques (Linstroth 2002).…”