Responsiveness and Electoral Accountability in the U.S. Senate

Abstract

This article examines the link between elections and the representational behavior of senators by considering whether ideological congruence with state preferences impacts vote shares on Election Day. We advance the literature on electoral accountability by proposing a more refined theoretical and empirical assessment of congruence with constituent preferences. Additionally, our analysis focuses on the effect of divergence in the Senate, which has been subject to significantly less attention than the House, and examines all elections to the upper chamber involving incumbents from 1960-2004. We find that measures of ideological divergence that are conditioned on the underlying ideological preferences of state constituencies significantly improve on existing measures, and that senators who are out of step with their state do in fact suffer at the polls.

A God of Vengeance and of Reward? Voters and Accountability

“…Whether or not we are convinced that citizens are sufficiently equipped to make reasoned choices, various studies find that incumbents who are ideologically “out of step” with their constituents tend to face punishment at the ballot box (e.g., Abramowitz ; Canes‐Wrone, Brody, and Cogan ; Canes‐Wrone, Minozzi, and Reveley ; Kassow and Finocchario ; Nyhan et al ), although representatives appear to have more leeway in the present context than in the past (Bonica and Cox forthcoming). However, aggregate findings do not necessarily imply that individual voters are punishing out‐of‐step members because other mechanisms may lead to electoral defeat.…”

Unpacking Representation in State Immigration Policy: Latino Composition, White Racial Threat, and Legislator Partisanship

“…In addition, legislators who know the preferences of their constituents are more likely to vote in that direction (Butler and Nickerson 2011; Kousser, Lewis, and Masket 2007). Moreover, representatives often pay an electoral price when their behavior is out of step with constituent attitudes (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Kassow and Finocchiaro 2011). Thus, research suggests representatives have an incentive to consider constituent preferences in policymaking.…”

The Senator�s Strategic Use of Time in Representation

“…Indeed, earlier studies find that the incumbent with the extreme party voting record becomes less successful in receiving vote shares during reelection, whereas the moderate position of the incumbent enhances her electoral margins (Erikson and Wright 2001;Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002;Kassow and Finocchiaro 2011). The findings offered by these two studies are sufficient to justify the assumption regarding electoral benefits from moderate positioning, hence validating the utility function predicting that the senator may seek to adjust the ideological positions congruent with her constituents' ideological preferences in order to enhance her electoral prospects.…”

“…The importance of constituent preferences is more profound when dealing with highly salient issues to constituents, because by taking a position congruent with constituent preferences, the incumbent could enhance her chances of winning reelection (Erikson and Wright 2001;Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002;Griffin 2006;Kassow and Finocchiaro 2011). To achieve reelection goals, legislators need to strengthen the ideological representational attachments with the preferences of constituencies.…”