Responsible Government and Capitalism’s Cycles

Böhle, Dorothee

doi:10.1080/01402382.2014.887876

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…It may not always be achievable or desirable. It may not be achievable because of external constraints linked to the market or international commitments (e.g., Bohle, 2014; Ezrow & Hellwig, 2014; Mair, 2009; Rose, 2013), and may not be desirable because it harms the ability to govern (King, 1997) or when the rights of a minority are at stake (e.g., Rehfeld, 2009). This tension is also reflected in Pitkin’s view of representation who famously posits that representation “is acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them,” thus granting some leeway to representatives (see Esaiasson & Narud, 2013, for a similar argument).…”

Section: Individual Attitudes Toward Responsiveness and Representative Rolesmentioning

confidence: 99%

I the People? Self-Interest and Demand for Government Responsiveness

Rosset

Giger

Bernauer

2016

Comparative Political Studies

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Whether elected representatives should be responsive to the wishes of the majority of citizens has been an issue often discussed from a normative perspective. This article shifts the focus by looking at the determinants of support for responsiveness among citizens. Its core argument is that attitudes toward responsiveness vary systematically depending on the policy gains an individual can expect from a government that is responsive to the preferences of the majority of citizens. The analysis of data from the European Social Survey and 21 countries confirms these expectations. Individuals whose ideological stances are reflected well by the incumbent government are less favorable to the idea that governments should be responsive to the preferences of the majority, while one’s proximity to the ideological location of the median citizen increases the odds of support for majority responsiveness. Our findings are stable across a large variety of European democracies.

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Section: Individual Attitudes Toward Responsiveness and Representative Rolesmentioning

confidence: 99%

I the People? Self-Interest and Demand for Government Responsiveness

Rosset

Giger

Bernauer

2016

Comparative Political Studies

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“…By preserving the country's long‐term interests, in turn, responsible governments ensure that citizens' demands can also be met in the future. In the short term, however, responsiveness and responsibility may sometimes be mutually exclusive, particularly during economic and financial crises, when the tasks of responding to social demands and fulfilling budgetary responsibilities are often diametrically opposed (Schäfer and Streeck, 2013; Bohle, 2014; Lefkofridi and Nezi, 2020). In these instances governments are confronted with the dilemma of which duties they should meet: their responsive duties or their responsible ones (Mair, 2013).…”

Section: The Relevance Of the Balance Between Responsiveness And Resp...mentioning

confidence: 99%

This Time Wasn't Different: Responsiveness and Responsibility in the Eurozone between 2007 and 2019

Karremans

2021

J of Common Market Studies

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This article investigates the balance between responsiveness and responsibility in France, Germany and Spain between 2017 and 2019. Based on the party-politics literature, the article argues that during crises responsibility may temporarily increase, but that subsequently governments need to base their actions on responsive policy criteria in order to maintain citizens' trust. Yet, given the dominance of austerity ideas during this decade and the introduction of a more stringent European fiscal framework, it is questionable whether responsiveness increased after the Eurozone crisis. Analysing original data from the yearly budget speeches of ministers of finance, the article finds that responsibility dominated budgetary policy-making in the early 2010s and that since 2014 responsiveness has increased, regardless of a country's financial situation. Furthermore, during the crisis responsibility tended to be higher under centre-right cabinets. The article portrays the early 2010s as an episode of 'politics in hard times' during which governments chose their policy response based on their ideas.

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“…Appointing technocratic ministers may be attractive in contemporary European politics for several reasons. First, party legitimacy has eroded significantly over the last decades (Ignazi, 2017), party linkages is shrinking (van Biezen and Poguntke, 2014), and the traditional model of 'party government' (Mair, 2008) is increasingly under scrutiny (Bohle, 2014). Recruiting ministers outside partisan circles could therefore be tempting for parties to respond to this legitimacy crisis.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the Causes of Technocratic Minister Appointments in Europe

Pilet,

Puleo,

Vittori

2023

Political Studies

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In the last decade, the appointment of technocratic ministers has become more common than ever before in Europe. Yet, scholarly attention has mostly focused on the economic determinants that lead to the appointment of such political outsiders in governments. In contrast, political determinants have not been fully examined. This article aims to investigate the role of economic determinants, as well as institutional factors (e.g. electoral system), party-system characteristics (e.g. volatility, polarization) and cabinet-related factors (e.g. intra-cabinet heterogeneity, the strength of populist parties within the government). Using a novel data set comprising data for more than 7000 ministers, including around 900 technocrats, our analysis shows that the share of populist parties within the cabinets has the strongest effect on the likelihood of appointing technocrats in national government. However, institutional-level variables appear to have no effect on the levels of technocratic appointments.

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Responsible Government and Capitalism’s Cycles

Cited by 8 publications

References 12 publications

I the People? Self-Interest and Demand for Government Responsiveness

I the People? Self-Interest and Demand for Government Responsiveness

This Time Wasn't Different: Responsiveness and Responsibility in the Eurozone between 2007 and 2019

Exploring the Causes of Technocratic Minister Appointments in Europe

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