Responsibility Voids and Cooperation

Duijf, Hein

doi:10.1177/0048393118767084

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 29 publications

(45 reference statements)

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“…Win-win is the best state that different stakeholders can achieve. The current study was the first to develop a win-win scale based on the research on cooperation, trust, and prosocial behavior (Smith, 2015;Duijf, 2018;Zlatev, 2019), and it expanded existing research. Moreover, the present study was of great value in promoting the harmonious development of humans and providing new perspectives for creating a community of shared future.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At present, most studies related to win-win in psychology were focused on trust, cooperation, and prosocial behavior (Smith, 2015;Duijf, 2018;Zlatev, 2019). For example, researchers proposed the reflective model of prosociality to explain the reasons why people's act was prosocial, stating that humans were born as creatures with non-moral and purely egoistic tendencies while prosocial behavior required exerting reflective control over this egoistic instinct (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999;Stevens and Hauser, 2004).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Development and Validation of the Win-Win Scale

2021

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Accumulating evidence has shown that win-win is necessary for both individuals and the society. This research, including two studies, aimed to develop and validate a measurement of the win-win scale. In the first study, we screened the items by item analysis and extracted common factors using exploratory factor analysis (EFA), thus determining a total of 25 items in the initial scale consisted of five dimensions including integrity, advancement, altruism, harmoniousness, and coordination. In the second study, we used first- and second-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test the scale’s construct validity. The results indicated a good fit between the five-factor model and the data. Based on our results, we have formed a win-win scale by keeping 16 items from the original project pool.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Development and Validation of the Win-Win Scale

2021

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“…This would be to embrace responsibility gaps as regrettable but unavoidable occurrences. We would have to do our best to identify all the individuals who can be held responsible for at least parts of the harm caused, but if the entirety of their responsibility falls 25 See, among others, Braham and van Hees (2011), Collins (2017), and Duijf (2018. On corporate responsibility more generally, see French (1984), Erskine (2001), Copp (2006), Pettit (2007), and List and Pettit (2011, Chap.…”

Section: Responsibility Gaps In Group Agency and Aimentioning

confidence: 99%

Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence

List

2021

Philos. Technol.

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The aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and a moral status? I will tentatively defend the (increasingly widely held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent systems, like corporate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited rights and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit the use of autonomous artificial systems in high-stakes settings only if they are engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents and/or there is some liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if artificial systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for extending a stronger moral status to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains very hypothetical.

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“…That is, cases where (NRV) holds, but (NIRV) for members of the same group does not. For example, in the discussion by Duijf [2018] the premises we provide in our axioms place us in a cooperative decision context with no external uncertainty but with coordination uncertainty. In the paper, this combination is shown to allow for the absence of individual responsibility in the presence of group responsibility.…”

Section: Axioms For Outcome Responsibility Functionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Individual responsibility is computed as the outcome responsibility of a singleton group. Thus, the point of view we take here does not stand in contrast to non-reducibility results known from the literature [Braham and van Hees, 2018, Duijf, 2018, Tamminga and Hindriks, 2020. To make the idea that group composition might inform point-wise member responsibility more precise, consider a situation in which an agent has the choice between two actions, one leading to an undesirable outcome with a certain probability and the other leaving the decision to a second agent.…”

Section: Background and Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Axiomatic Approach to Formalized Responsibility Ascription

Hiller¹,

Israel²,

Heitzig³

2021

Preprint

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Quantified responsibility ascription in complex scenarios is of crucial importance in current debates regarding collective action, for example in the face of various environmental crises. Within this endeavour, we recently proposed considering a probabilistic view of causation, rather than the deterministic views employed in much of the previous formal responsibility literature, and presented a corresponding framework as well as initial candidate functions applicable to a range of scenarios. In the current paper, we extend this contribution by formally evaluating the qualities of proposed functions through an axiomatic approach. First, we decompose responsibility ascription into distinct contributing functions, before defining a number of desirable properties, or axioms, for these. Afterwards we evaluate the proposed functions regarding compliance with these axioms. We find an incompatibility between axioms determining upper and lower bounds in one of the contributing functions, imposing a choice for one variant -upper bound or lower bound. For the other contributing function we are able to axiomatically characterise one specific function. As the previously mentioned incompatibility extends to the combined responsibility function we finally present maximally axiom compliant combined functions for each variant -including the upper bound axiom or including the lower bound axiom.

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Responsibility Voids and Cooperation

Cited by 10 publications

References 29 publications

Development and Validation of the Win-Win Scale

Development and Validation of the Win-Win Scale

Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence

An Axiomatic Approach to Formalized Responsibility Ascription

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