RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND MILITARIZED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: When and Why the Churches Failed to Discern Moral Hazard

Abstract

This essay addresses moral hazards associated with the emerging doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It reviews the broad acceptance by the Vatican and the World Council of Churches of the doctrine between September 2003 and September 2008, and attempts to identify grounds for more adequate investigation of the moral issues arising. Three themes are pursued: how a changing political context is affecting notions of sovereignty; the authority that can approve or refuse the use of force; and plural foundations for human rights in a religiously and otherwise plural world such that the human rights protection does not become tyrannical.

In Defense of the Responsibility to Protect

“…Reed laments that, in the key years of the emergence of R2P prior to 2008, the churches were “broadly uncritical in welcoming the R2P doctrine even though it moved debate about the use of force toward the requiring of states to be proactive militarily rather than reactive” (, 314). Difficult questions were left unasked, Reed claims.…”

“…Difficult questions were left unasked, Reed claims. These included questions about the desirability of embracing a doctrine that “is locked into a particular human rights discourse and promotion of Western liberal values,” the desirability of widening the legal grounds for the use of force and legalizing “unilateral or regional organization intervention,” and the desirability of accepting a doctrine of humanitarian intervention that in practice is frequently merged “with broader security concerns and political agendas” and leads to interventions that often do “more harm than good” (, 320, 329).…”

“…IN HER RECENT ESSAY, “Responsibility to Protect and Militarized Humanitarian Intervention,” in the Journal of Religious Ethics , Esther Reed humbly acknowledges that a theologian presuming to say something to the debate about the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle “risks blundering into the proverbial china shop and knocking over everything not nailed firmly to the floor” (, 309). Unfortunately, I fear Reed has done just that.…”

Responsibility to Protect and Militarized Humanitarian Intervention

“…The ICISS Report (ICISS ) proposed six criteria for military intervention under the following headings: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects. I mentioned issues surrounding “ ‘right authority” ’ in the previous article (Reed ) and, while continuing to maintain that this is a matter of pressing concern, refrain from commenting again here.…”

“…My article “Responsibility to Protect and Militarized Humanitarian Intervention: When and Why the Churches Failed to Discern Moral Hazard” called for critical engagement by the churches rather than the broadly uncritical welcome that was given to the doctrine between September 2003 and September 2008 (Reed ). The central point was that notes of concern were a long time coming from the churches and seemed barely to touch upon moral issues concerning the militarization of humanitarian action, the blurring of humanitarian and security‐related or other Western liberal political agendas, the authority of customary international law regarding the authorization of force, and more.…”