Responsibility, Autonomy, Affectivity

Crowell, Steven

doi:10.4324/9781315771861-14

Cited by 10 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…Falling, on this account, is “an effort to avoid exercising” one's ownmost potentiality‐to‐be (Richardson , 143; emphasis added). Fleeing is accordingly an “‘inauthentic’ strategy ” (Crowell, , 226; emphasis added). Richardson tells us that only a psychological “aversion [can] explain the urgency with which” Dasein flees toward entities within the world (2012, 137).…”

Section: The Upshot Of the Analysis Of Anxietymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…M&R). According to many interpreters, falling is “an effort to avoid exercising” one's ownmost potentiality‐to‐be (Richardson , 143)—an “‘inauthentic’ strategy” (Crowell, , 226), motivated by “a desire to avoid the anxiety and responsibility that come from being answerable for myself” (Wrathall , 206). According to these interpretations, both anxiety and the condition it disrupts—falling—are psychological phenomena.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Ontological Import of Heidegger's Analysis of Anxiety in Being and Time

Magid¹

2016

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Heidegger's primary concern in Being and Time is the question of the meaning of being-a distinctly ontological concern. Yet, with discussions of death, guilt, conscience, anxiety, uncanniness, authenticity, and inauthenticity, Heidegger seems to end up in existential territory. The ontological import of these existential excursions is difficult to discern-indeed, it has not been identified in leading interpretations. In this paper, I aim to highlight the ontological import of Heidegger's analysis of anxiety-it manifests the inadequacy of Dasein's fallen and inauthentic self-understanding, which is motivated by the inadequacy of Dasein's fallen and inauthentic, average understanding of being. In making this case, I will clarify the sense in which anxiety involves an experience of world-collapse and show how it functions to reveal the possibilities of authenticity and inauthenticity.Oren Magid received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Georgetown University, where he currently teaches, in 2015. His primary area of research is 20th century European philosophy, especially Heidegger. 1 I mean this not in the sense of Heidegger's contrast between existential and existentiell, but in the sense associated with traditional existentialist philosophy.

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Section: The Upshot Of the Analysis Of Anxietymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Ontological Import of Heidegger's Analysis of Anxiety in Being and Time

Magid¹

2016

The Southern J of Philosophy

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“…Cf. also Thomson : 452–53 and Crowell : 218: ‘existential death … is the ability to be without being able to be anything’.…”

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confidence: 99%

Being‐Towards‐Death and Owning One's Judgment

McManus

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…To say that Dasein is first and foremost rational fails to account for a more basic way in which the world is disclosed to it. For an excellent account of how our affectedness is not antithetical to reason but rather, informs it, see Crowell , specifically p. 35.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…This question raised by these two conflicting claims is not settled in the literature. For a compelling interpretation, see Crowell , 14ff.…”

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confidence: 99%

Toward a Phenomenology of Mood

Freeman¹

2014

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Martin Heidegger's account of attunement [Befindlichkeit] through mood [Stimmung] is unprecedented in the history of philosophy and groundbreaking vis‐à‐vis contemporary accounts of emotion. On his view, moods are not mere mental states that result from, arise out of, or are caused by our situation or context. Rather, moods are fundamental modes of existence that are disclosive of the way one is or finds oneself [sich befinden] in the world. Mood is one of the basic modes through which we experience the world and through which the world is made present to us. Moreover, moods are the lenses through which things, people, animals, events, and aspects in the world matter to us. In this paper, I make the case that Heidegger's insights with respect to mood can and ought to be extended beyond the narrow scope of his fundamental ontology (in Being and Time) in which they were developed. I argue that contemporary accounts of mood within psychology ought to take these Heideggerian insights seriously and use them when defining, studying, evaluating, and drawing conclusions about the nature of moods. There are three sections to my paper. In section 1, I delineate Heidegger's account of mood. In section 2, I turn to some key studies on mood in psychology, and I elaborate upon some of the main shortcomings in this literature. In section 3, I suggest how psychology might benefit from understanding and utilizing a Heideggerian‐inspired phenomenology of mood.

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Responsibility, Autonomy, Affectivity

Cited by 10 publications

References 1 publication

The Ontological Import of Heidegger's Analysis of Anxiety in Being and Time

The Ontological Import of Heidegger's Analysis of Anxiety in Being and Time

Being‐Towards‐Death and Owning One's Judgment

Toward a Phenomenology of Mood

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