Responsibility and the ‘Pie Fallacy’

Kaiserman, Alex

doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01616-1

Cited by 21 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 29 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Moreover, accounts of responsibility attribution should avoid committing the fixed-pie fallacy (Kaiserman, 2021) the false assumption that there is a total amount of responsibility that can be allocated, or in other words, treating responsibility as a finite resource. The statement "when Ben interacts with Asimo, he would assume that there are authorities responsible for what Asimo char actually does…" (target article, sect.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social robots as depictions of social agents

Clark¹,

Fischer²

2022

Behav Brain Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Social robots serve people as tutors, caretakers, receptionists, companions, and other social agents. People know that the robots are mechanical artifacts, yet they interact with them as if they were actual agents. How is this possible? The proposal here is that people construe social robots not as social agents per se, but as depictions of social agents. They interpret them much as they interpret ventriloquist dummies, hand puppets, virtual assistants, and other interactive depictions of people and animals. Depictions as a class consist of three physical scenes with part-by-part mappings between them: (a) a base scene (the raw physical artifact), (b) the depiction proper (the artifact construed as a depiction), and (c) the scene depicted (the scene people are to imagine). With social robots, evidence shows, people form the same three scenes plus mappings: They perceive the raw machinery of a robot, construe it as a depiction of a character, and, using the depiction as a guide, engage in the pretense that they are interacting with the character depicted. So, with social robots, people also recognize three classes of agents—the characters depicted, the intended recipients of the depictions (those who view or interact with the robots), and the authorities responsible for the robots (the designers, makers, and owners). Construing social robots as depictions, we argue, accounts for many phenomena not covered by alternative models.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social robots as depictions of social agents

Clark¹,

Fischer²

2022

Behav Brain Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For a comprehensive analysis, see: (Poel, 2015). 24 For an analysis on this, see: (Kaiserman, 2021;Zimmerman, 1985). 25 It is debated whether collective entities can be qualified as group agents that can be held morally responsible.…”

Section: The Existence Of Responsibility Gapsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Responsibility Gap and LAWS: a Critical Mapping of the Debate

Oimann

2023

Philos. Technol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

AI has numerous applications and in various fields, including the military domain. The increase in the degree of autonomy in some decision-making systems leads to discussions on the possible future use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). A central issue in these discussions is the assignment of moral responsibility for some AI-based outcomes. Several authors claim that the high autonomous capability of such systems leads to a so-called “responsibility gap.” In recent years, there has been a surge in philosophical literature around the concept of responsibility gaps and different solutions have been devised to close or bridge these gaps. In order to move forward in the research around LAWS and the problem of responsibility, it is important to increase our understanding of the different perspectives and discussions in this debate. This paper attempts to do so by disentangling the various arguments and providing a critical overview. After giving a brief outline of the state of the technology of LAWS, I will review the debates over responsibility gaps using three differentiators: those who believe in the existence of responsibility gaps versus those who do not, those who hold that responsibility gaps constitute a new moral problem versus those who argue they do not, and those who claim that solutions can be successful as opposed to those who believe that it is an unsolvable problem.

show abstract

“…The notion of value falls short in situations where contributions are incommensurable or don't combine additively toward the group outcome. In some cases, multiple agents can all be fully responsible for the same outcome (Kaiserman, 2021;Lagnado et al, 2013). In other cases, multiple agents can contribute the same value, but still be held responsible to different degrees.…”

Section: Responsibility and Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

If not me, then who? Responsibility and replacement

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

How do people hold others responsible? Responsibility judgments are affected not only by what actually happened, but also by what could have happened if things had turned out differently. Here, we look at how replaceability -- the ease with which a person could have been replaced by someone else -- affects responsibility. We develop the counterfactual replacement model which runs simulations of alternative scenarios to determine the probability that the outcome would have been different if the person of interest had been replaced. The model predicts that a person is held more responsible when it would have been more difficult to replace them. To test the model's predictions, we design a paradigm that quantitatively varies replaceability by manipulating the number of replacements as well as the probability with which each replacement would have been available. Across three experiments featuring increasingly complex scenarios, we show that the model explains participants' responsibility judgments well in both social and physical settings, and better than alternative models that rely only on features of what actually happened.

show abstract

Responsibility and the ‘Pie Fallacy’

Cited by 21 publications

References 29 publications

Social robots as depictions of social agents

Social robots as depictions of social agents

The Responsibility Gap and LAWS: a Critical Mapping of the Debate

If not me, then who? Responsibility and replacement

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About