Response to Erik Goodwyn's paper ‘Phenotypic plasticity and archetype: a response to common objections to the biological theory of archetype and instinct’

Abstract

Response to GoodwynI am glad and grateful that the editors of this journal are giving me the opportunity to respond to Goodwyn's nuanced article. I would also like to thank Erik Goodwyn for his praise of my publications. In recent years, Goodwyn (2020) has presented in a number of publications a differentiated view of the biological transmission of mental traits based on the latest findings from genetics, referring in particular to the mechanism of geneenvironment-coaction. In this context, he criticizes my argument that the reference to instincts and genetic transmission does not make a constructive contribution to clarifying the debate about archetypes.I would like to make it clear at this point that I do not contradict Goodwyn's argument, insofar as he describes mechanisms in which genes interact specifically with input from the environment or experience during development and thus achieve certain developmental goals, such as walking upright. However, what I have repeatedly questioned and continue to question is the claim that such biological mechanisms can explain the emergence of what is called archetypes in analytical psychology.The central point is that this reasoning by Goodwyn, as well as by other authors who argue biologically (e.g. Anthony Stevens 2003), fails to clarify the most important point in the debate: the definition of archetype. It is striking that Goodwyn assumes that it is clear what is meant by the term archetype. This is by no means the case; on the contrary, I have made it clear in my recent publications that one has to speak of a definitional chaos regarding the archetype concept in analytical psychology.First, to clarify which publications Goodwyn's criticism refers to: I published a book in 2016 entitled The Archetype Concept of C.G. Jung in German; this

Genome and psyche: a response to Christian Roesler’s critique

“…but that does not erase the fact that we are not only humans, but belong to family hominidae , order primates , class mammalia , phylum chordata and kingdom animalia, all of which designations have universal common features and attributes as well as evolutionary history. No doubt Roesler would readily acknowledge this undisputed fact, but then why, in a footnote, would he question my reference to the work of affective neuroscientists Jaak Panksepp and others by exclaiming that ‘Panksepp developed his model by investigating animals, not humans!’ (Roesler 2023, p. 135). Upon reading this I realize my biomedical background makes the relevance of such comparative study as self‐evident.…”

“…Roesler goes so far as to say: ‘As a consequence for archetype theory, this means that in order to explain universal similarities, e.g. in mythological motifs, we no longer need a biological theory of any kind of genetic transmission, because they can be sufficiently explained by cultural exchange’ (Roesler 2023, p. 139).…”