Responding to the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak: Lessons learned in a Toronto emergency department

Appraisal of recommended respiratory infection control practices in primary care and emergency department settings

“…One quarter (24%) of medical practitioners; approximately 15% of nurses, nurse aides, and allied professionals; and 40% of administrative staff reported that they had not received any training on respiratory infection control and personal protection practices during the previous 12 months (P , .001). Of those who received training, approximately half of medical practitioners (52%), nurses (47%), nurse aides (46%), allied [28] 129 (76) [10] 70 (78) [7] 47 (64) [9] 51 (65) [6] .004 Practice respiratory precautions 116 (74) [30] 121 (72) [13] 69 (77) [7] 50 (67) [7] 58 (72) [3] .…”

Management of patients infected with airborne-spread diseases: An algorithm for infection control professionals

“…As the number of SARS cases increased, the need for negative-pressure facilities increased at an almost parallel rate. 13 In response, Mount Sinai Hospital in Toronto was forced to expand its number of negative-pressure beds 7-fold, and future expansions are under consideration. 13 It has been estimated that Canada's 3 to 4 month outbreak of SARS cost $1.5 to $2 billion.…”

“…13 In response, Mount Sinai Hospital in Toronto was forced to expand its number of negative-pressure beds 7-fold, and future expansions are under consideration. 13 It has been estimated that Canada's 3 to 4 month outbreak of SARS cost $1.5 to $2 billion. 14 US hospitals can learn from Toronto's SARS experience and examine the potential consequences of a bioterrorism attack using smallpox or an outbreak of SARS in which many additional negative-pressure rooms or protected environments may be required to help contain disease spread.…”

“…Previous publications have outlined appropriate planning and response steps for bioterrorism and emerging infections. 8,13,15 However, these publications either assume that negative-pressure rooms are available and functioning or that patients will be transported immediately to appropriate facilities. They do not identify alternative options for responding in suboptimal situations, such as when a negative-pressure environment is not available.…”

Collateral damage: the effect of SARS on medical education

“…On Tuesday April 1, 2003, the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care announced measures to restrict and control the spread of SARS in response to the spreading SARS epidemic 6–8 . These restrictions included use of barrier precautions (gloves, gowns, masks and eye protection) in acute care areas such as Emergency Departments, curtailment or cancellation of elective procedures and the transfer of patients, bans on movement of staff between different hospital or health care settings, and limitation of patient contact to essential health care personnel.…”