Respects for Contradictions

Égré, Paul

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-25365-3_4

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Dialetheists like Graham Priest think otherwise, and view the sentence as both true and false (Priest 1979(Priest , 2006. One way in which dialetheism can be defended is by considering an analogy between the Liar and vague sentences (McGee 1990;Cobreros et al 2015;Égré 2019. Unlike absurd sentences, presupposition failures, or sentences with unresolved indexical pronouns, the Liar may be viewed as a borderline case of application of the vague predicate "true".…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth and Falsity in Buridan's Bridge

Égré¹

2022

Preprint

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This paper revisits Buridan's Bridge paradox (Sophismata, chapter 8, Sophism 17), itself close kin to the Liar paradox, a version of which also appears in Bradwardine's Insolubilia. Prompted by the occurrence of the paradox in Cervantes's Don Quixote, I discuss and compare four distinct solutions to the problem, namely Bradwardine's "just false" conception, Buridan's "contingently true/false" theory, Cervantes's "both true and false" view, and then Jacquette's "neither true simpliciter nor false simpliciter" account. All have in common to accept that the Bridge expresses a truth-apt proposition, but only the latter three endorse the transparency of truth. Against some previous commentaries I first show that Buridan's solution is fully compliant with an account of the paradox within classical logic. I then show that Cervantes's insights, as well as Jacquette's treatment, are both supportive of a dialetheist account, and Jacquette's in particular of the strict-tolerant account of truth. I defend dialetheist intuitions (whether in LP or ST guise) against two objections: one concerning the future, the other concerning the alleged simplicity of the Bridge compared to the Liar.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth and Falsity in Buridan's Bridge

Égré¹

2022

Preprint

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Truth and Falsity in Buridan’s Bridge

Égré

2023

Synthese

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Eubulide et la conséquence logique

Égré

2024

Revue De Métaphysique Et De Morale

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Eubulide de Milet est connu comme l’auteur d’un ensemble considérable d’arguments logiques déconcertants, encore appelés sophismes ou paradoxes. Parmi ceux-ci figurent l’antinomie du Menteur et le paradoxe du Sorite. Peut-on donner une solution unifiée de ces paradoxes ? La réponse examinée dans cet essai est positive et vise à faire connaître la théorie stricte-tolérante , développée à l’origine pour résoudre le Sorite avant d’être transposée au Menteur. Selon cette théorie, la conclusion d’un argument suit logiquement des prémisses quand la vérité stricte des prémisses implique la vérité tolérante de la conclusion. Si les notions de vérité stricte et tolérante coïncident dans un cadre bivalent, elles se recouvrent seulement partiellement dans un cadre trivalent. Nous expliquons en quel sens la théorie stricte-tolérante confère aux notions mêmes de vérité et de conséquence logique un caractère d’équivocité. Or l’identification d’une équivocité préside à la solution d’autres paradoxes, comme dans l’argument du Cornu également dû à Eubulide.

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Respects for Contradictions

Cited by 3 publications

References 26 publications

Truth and Falsity in Buridan's Bridge

Truth and Falsity in Buridan's Bridge

Truth and Falsity in Buridan’s Bridge

Eubulide et la conséquence logique

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