Respect as the Foundation of Human Rights: To What Extent Can This View Be Attributed to Kant?

Göbel, Marie; Giorgini, Giovanni; Irrera, Elena

doi:10.1515/9783110526288-008

The Roots of Respect 2017

DOI: 10.1515/9783110526288-008

|View full text |Cite

Respect as the Foundation of Human Rights: To What Extent Can This View Be Attributed to Kant?

Marie Göbel¹,

Giovanni Giorgini²,

Elena Irrera³

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Publication Types

Select...

Other1

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent1

Authors

Journals

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This presupposes to address a question that I have bracketed thus far, namely how human dignity is itself interpreted in legal practice, and to what extent the interpretative openness of human dignity fulfills itself an important function in law. I will systematically take up this question in the next chapter.548 Parts of this chapter have formerly been published inDüwell / Göbel 2017 andGöbel 2017.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Dignity as the Ground of Human Rights

Göbel

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

How can we make sense of the claim that human dignity is the moral ground of human rights? And what does this assumption imply for our understanding of the interconnections and tensions between the moral and legal dimension of human rights? In my dissertation I address these questions by distinguishing systematically between a concept of human rights as a specific kind of moral norms and a specific kind of legal norms. I defend a hermeneutical approach to our understanding of the “nature” of human rights: As moral norms, human rights are grounded in the necessary practical self-understanding of every human agent. In judicial practice, the concrete meaning of legal human rights-norms is interpreted in the light of the particular self-understanding of legal communities. What a moral and a legal understanding of human rights have in common is the assumption that they have a universal moral ground – human dignity. I argue that human dignity should be understood as a universal moral status that expresses the fundamental moral obligation to respect every human being as a holder of moral human rights. Human dignity so understood implies a criterion for specifying human rights and for putting them into a hierarchy, while at the same time it leaves significant room for their context-specific interpretation. To the extent that the legal human rights practice claims to be morally committed to protecting human dignity, judicial interpretations of human rights should be guided by this understanding of human dignity.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Dignity as the Ground of Human Rights

Göbel

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.

Contact Info

hi@scite.ai

10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614

Henderson, NV 89052, USA

Blog Terms and Conditions API Terms Privacy Policy Contact Cookie Preferences Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information

Made with 💙 for researchers

Part of the Research Solutions Family.

Respect as the Foundation of Human Rights: To What Extent Can This View Be Attributed to Kant?

Cited by 1 publication

References 0 publications

Human Dignity as the Ground of Human Rights

Human Dignity as the Ground of Human Rights

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About