Resource harvesting regulation and enforcement: An evolutionary approach

Abstract

We study the evolution of compliance and regulation in a common pool resource setup with myopic appropriators whose decision on whether to comply or not with the harvesting rule is a result of imitation as described by a proportional rule. The regulator …rst sets the optimal quota and then harvesters can choose between compliance and violation. We investigate myopic regulation and optimal regulation regimes with both proportional and non-proportional …ne formulation and and an endogenized probability of audition. The equilibria are then characterized in terms of their stability properties.

An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation

“…Also in this case, the probability of being discovered discovered, φ, will be a function of the share of non-compliant firms. Therefore, we prefer to represent it as (4), for obvious reasons of tractability, following Petrohilos-Andrianos andXepapadeas (2017).…”