We document how a shock to investment opportunities at one plant ("treated plant") spills over to other plants within the same firm, but only if the firm is financially constrained. To provide the treated plant with resources, headquarters withdraws capital and labor from other plants, especially from plants that are relatively less productive, not part of the firm's core industries, and located far away from headquarters. As a result of the resource reallocation, aggregate firm-wide productivity increases. We do not find any evidence of capital or labor spillovers among plants of financially unconstrained firms. * Giroud is with the MIT Sloan School of Management and NBER; Mueller is with the NYU Stern School of Business, NBER, CEPR, and ECGI. We thank Michael Roberts (the editor), two anonymous referees, our discussants Owen Lamont (NBER) and Hyunseob Kim (UNC Junior Faculty Roundtable), and seminar participants at the NBER Corporate Finance Summer Institute, Micro@Sloan Conference, UNC Junior Faculty Roundtable, University of Chicago (Booth), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Sloan), New York University (Stern), Harvard Business School, London Business School, London School of Economics, Duke University (Fuqua), Cornell University (Johnson), Washington University in St. Louis (Olin), University of Maryland (Smith), University of British Columbia (Sauder), Dartmouth College (Tuck), University of Utah (Eccles), Arizona State University (Carey), Georgia Institute of Technology (Scheller), INSEAD, HEC Paris, Stockholm School of Economics, City University (Cass), University of Florida (Warrington), University of Western Ontario (Ivey), Bentley University, WU Vienna, and Humboldt University for helpful comments. The research in this paper was conducted while the authors were Special Sworn Status researchers of the U.S. Census Bureau at the New York and Boston Census Research Data Centers. Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed.
1Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436552There is a close link between the theory of internal capital markets and the theory of the firm. Accordingly, headquarters can create value by actively reallocating scarce resources across projects. In particular, headquarters' control rights enable it to take resources away from some projects and give them to other, more deserving ones (Alchian (1969), Williamson (1975), Stein (1997)). By contrast, an external lender, such as a bank, does not possess the authority to reallocate resources across borrowers.This fundamental idea-that headquarters can create value by actively reallocating scarce resources-is testable. Stein (1997, p. 112) formulates the "efficient internal capital markets hypothesis" as follows:"Thus, for example, if a company owns two unrelated divisions A and B, and the appeal of investing in B suddenly increases, ...