Resource Allocation and Pricing in Non-cooperative Interference Networks with Malicious Users

Shen, Fei; Chorppath, Anil Kumar; Jorswieck, Eduard A.; Boche, Holger

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-22440-4_13

Cited by 1 publication

(3 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…The corresponding Nash equilibrium allows intrusion detection systems to have an optimal defense strategy. In the context of wireless security, the non-cooperative game was used to discourage compromised users to launch DoS attacks to legitimate users [33].…”

Section: A Game-theoretic Pricingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The authors in [33] addressed the DDoS attack in a multipleaccess system with the coexistence of malicious users, i.e., compromised users, and selfish users. The model is shown in Fig.…”

Section: B Distributed Dos (Ddos) Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Advantages Disadvantages [15] • Provide a distributed solution • Support only one jammer [33] • Provide a distributed solution and support multiple malicious and selfish users • Require learning techniques [5] • Achieve centralized decisions on both power and price • Be challenging to infer the utilities of users [17] • Have low overhead communication • Do not record misbehaviors of malicious sensors [40] • Be simple to be implemented and revoke quickly malicious nodes • Require IDSs and the trust authority regular users if the attackers have full knowledge of the locations of the regular users in the network. In realistic environments, when the locations of legitimate users are revealed, they would have a high risk from physical attacks by the adversaries.…”

Section: Major Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Applications of Economic and Pricing Models for Wireless Network Security: A Survey

Luong

Hoang

Wang

et al. 2017

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

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Abstract-This paper provides a comprehensive literature review on applications of economic and pricing theory to security issues in wireless networks. Unlike wireline networks, the broadcast nature and the highly dynamic change of network environments pose a number of nontrivial challenges to security design in wireless networks. While the security issues have not been completely solved by traditional or system-based solutions, economic and pricing models recently were employed as one efficient solution to discourage attackers and prevent attacks to be performed. In this paper, we review economic and pricing approaches proposed to address major security issues in wireless networks including eavesdropping attack, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack such as jamming and Distributed DoS (DDoS), and illegitimate behaviors of malicious users. Additionally, we discuss integrating economic and pricing models with cryptography methods to reduce information privacy leakage as well as to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of information in wireless networks. Finally, we highlight important challenges, open issues and future research directions of applying economic and pricing models to wireless security issues.

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Section: A Game-theoretic Pricingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The authors in [33] addressed the DDoS attack in a multipleaccess system with the coexistence of malicious users, i.e., compromised users, and selfish users. The model is shown in Fig.…”

Section: B Distributed Dos (Ddos) Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%