Resort to War, 1816-2007

Wayman, Frank Whelon; Sarkees, Meredith Reid

doi:10.4135/9781608718276

Cited by 528 publications

(287 citation statements)

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“…I obtain this data from the Correlates of War capability (CINC) components, Version 3.02 (Singer et al, 1972). (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). This variable captures the idea that military officers are more united around the incumbent leader and are less likely to attempt a coup during war.…”

Section: Log(gdp/capita) and Change In Gdp/capita -A Year-to-year Permentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships

Sudduth

2017

Comparative Political Studies

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Why do some leaders eliminate rivals from authoritarian regimes and therefore diminish elites' capabilities to remove them via coups, while others do not? By examining both dictators' incentives and opportunities to weaken regime elites, I show that dictators are more likely to eliminate rivals when elites' capabilities to oust dictators via coup is temporarily low. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, my theory predicts that dictators are more likely to weaken elites' capabilities as the threat of coup decreases rather than when coup risk is high. Furthermore, I argue that successful coups that put new dictators in power temporarily diminish elites' capabilities to remove dictators and, thus, provide a window of opportunity for the dictators to take steps to consolidate power. Empirical results using a new dataset on purges of militaries from 1969 to 2003 provide strong evidence for my hypotheses.

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Section: Log(gdp/capita) and Change In Gdp/capita -A Year-to-year Permentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships

Sudduth

2017

Comparative Political Studies

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“…5 The only measure of ancestral links of theirs that we were able to use readily is the history of wars; or at least we could do so by limiting ourselves to wars since 1823 rather than 1500 as they had. This more limited measure of ancestral conflicts, it should be noted, has already proven useful in related work concerning civil wars by Sarkees and Wayman (2010) (to say nothing of related work by Martin et al (2008) where the civil war data starts only in 1950).…”

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confidence: 99%

Native language, spoken language, translation and trade

Mélitz¹,

Toubal²

2014

Journal of International Economics

494

390

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Abstract:We construct new series for common native language and common spoken language for 195 countries, which we use together with series for common official language and linguistic proximity in order to draw inferences about (1) the aggregate impact of all linguistic factors on bilateral trade, (2) whether the linguistic influences come from ethnicity and trust or ease of communication, and (3) in so far they come from ease of communication, to what extent translation and interpreters play a role. The results show that the impact of linguistic factors, all together, is at least twice as great as the usual dummy variable for common language, resting on official language, would say. In addition, ease of communication is far more important than ethnicity and trust. Further, so far as ease of communication is at work, translation and interpreters are extremely important. Finally, ethnicity and trust come into play largely because of immigrants and their influence is otherwise difficult to detect. JEL Classification: F10; F40

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“…Following these principles, within the literature, authors often establish thresholds of fatalities to define a given event as civil war -e.g. 25 battle-related fatalities, as seen in work citing the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002) or 1000 battle-related fatalities, as seen in work citing the Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). We adopt a new approach defining an event as a "civil war event" when the two follow-ing conditions are met: (1) rebel groups fight against the state in at least two regions within the country -this provides a proxy for whether the rebel group embodies an effective geographical challenge; and (2) during the conflict, an effective exchange of territory occurs, independent from which actor may be acquiring or losing it.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Foreign Investment and State Conflicts in Africa

Kishi

Maggio

Raleigh

2017

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

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Abstract:Rates of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa are increasing, yet little is known about how this will affect the political environment. One possibility, explored here, is that increasing levels of FDI within developing states will incentivize state conflict activity. Using an instrumental strategy, we show that in states with a low regard for civil liberties, or with unhealthy economies (i.e. states with a cash deficit), increased access to investment is associated with a higher number of conflict actions by the state. We argue that access to investment can push regimes into using violent strategies to secure their internal environment and to ensure their survival, specifically in their engaging in conflict against opposition and armed combatants. This underscores the need for extensive monitoring of state behavior following the receipt of investment, similar to the oversight of conditional aid.

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Resort to War, 1816-2007

Cited by 528 publications

References 0 publications

Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships

Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships

Native language, spoken language, translation and trade

Foreign Investment and State Conflicts in Africa

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