Resolute Readings of the<i>Tractatus</i>

Bronzo, Silver; James, Conant

doi:10.1002/9781118884607.ch10

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…One may say that according to resolute interpretations, Wittgenstein is inviting his readers to enter into a certain sort of game: they start to wonder whether they are ready to give a definite sense to the sentences of the Tractatus, and reading the book leads them to recognizeon the basis of ordinary criteria of meaningfulness (Diamond 2011: 272) that its sentences are nonsensical. This recognition is piecemeal (Diamond 2004: 153-154); the claim that the sentences of the Tractatus are nonsensical is not inferred from any ineffable doctrines that are somehow supposedly conveyed by it (Conant and Bronzo 2017). The correct reading of the Tractatus leads to the removal of philosophical problems which stem from "the misunderstanding of the logic of our language."…”

Section: An Overview Of Interpretationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tractarian Sätze: Instructions for Use

Wawrzyniak

2019

Philosophia

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The main question addressed by this article is this: How should one understand the role of the sentences of the Tractatus, given Wittgenstein's statement that they are nonsensical? I begin with a presentation of three general principles of interpretation in order to avoid answering the question in an inappropriate way. I then move on to a short presentation and commentary on a selection of readingsnamely, the ineffabilist, resolute and elucidatory onesand elaborate the answers given by advocates of these to the question explored here. I agree on many points with resolute and elucidatory readings: the Tractatus presents an austere conception of nonsense, and is not a book that seeks to present ontological or semantic theories. I point out, however, that these readings cannot fully explain the nature of Tractarian elucidations. Then I discuss those parts of the Tractatus which refer to the sentences of the book itself. The main proposal of my own approach is this: Tractarian elucidations should be construed as rules of translation (definitions), in that they show how to substitute certain expressions for others. They enable us to construct a notation in which everything that is expressible in ordinary language can be said perspicuously.

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Section: An Overview Of Interpretationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tractarian Sätze: Instructions for Use

Wawrzyniak

2019

Philosophia

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“…Mijn perspectief leunt aan bij de Girondistische strekking. Conant & Bronzo (2017) leveren een goed overzicht, dat meteen ook een aantal invloedrijke misvattingen over resolute lezingen uit de wereld helpt.…”

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‘Een mogelijk teken moet ook kunnen betekenen’. Hacker over onzin en verkeerd gebruik in Wittgensteins Tractatus

Vanrie

2023

Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Wijsbegeerte

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A possible sign must also be able to signify': Hacker on nonsense and misuse in Wittgenstein's Tractatus This paper critically discusses Hacker's reading of nonsense in Wittgenstein's Tractatus in terms of his notion of misuse, which is taken to consist in the violation of rules of logical syntax.I argue that Hacker's reading relies on an equivocation between sign and symbol: what is 'misused' is a mere sign, but the verdict of nonsensicality relies on seeing it as a symbol.Although Hacker seeks to distance himself from resolute readings -according to which nonsense always consists in nothing but a failure to assign meaning to one's sentences -I argue that his own verdicts of nonsensicality have their ultimate grounds in exactly the same sort of assessment, i.e. whether meaning has been assigned to a sentence. The rules of logical syntax, contrary to his own intentions, do no real work in determining whether a sentence is nonsensical or not.

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“…Conant e Bronzo (2017) destacam a concepção austera de contrassenso como um dos quatro compromissos da leitura resoluta. Os demais compromissos são os seguintes: a rejeição da suposição interpretativa de que o Tractatus pretende propor uma teoria ou doutrina filosófica, a rejeição da ideia de que o Tractatus pretende apresentar uma teoria ou doutrina inefável e, por último, a ideia de que o papel de uma notação lógica adequada ou Begriffsschrift na atividade de clarificação lógica de pensamentos não é servir como um teste para determinar se as sentenças da linguagem comum estão de acordo com as proscrições de alguma teoria da significatividade supostamente estabelecida no livro.4 Utilizo aqui a expressão empregada porFrascolla (2007, p. 118), embora discorde de sua interpretação.…”

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Uma interpretação resoluta da crítica de Wittgenstein à teoria do juízo de Russell

Segatto

2022

Perspec. Filos.

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Este artigo tem dois objetivos. Em primeiro lugar, pretende-se mostrar que grande parte dos comentadores interpretam incorretamente a crítica de Wittgenstein à teoria do juízo de Russell, na medida em que compartilham uma suposição comum, a saber: ao interpretar a objeção de que tal teoria não impede que se julgue um contrassenso, eles erroneamente atribuem a Wittgenstein uma concepção substancial de contrassenso, que é estranha à sua concepção austera de contrassenso. Em segundo lugar, pretende-se indicar que essa crítica deve ser entendida como parte da crítica de Wittgenstein à incapacidade de Russell de dar uma resposta ao problema da unidade da proposição.

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Resolute Readings of theTractatus

Cited by 6 publications

References 22 publications

Tractarian Sätze: Instructions for Use

Tractarian Sätze: Instructions for Use

‘Een mogelijk teken moet ook kunnen betekenen’. Hacker over onzin en verkeerd gebruik in Wittgensteins Tractatus

Uma interpretação resoluta da crítica de Wittgenstein à teoria do juízo de Russell

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