Resisting change: information-seeking and stereotype change

Johnston, Lucy

doi:10.1002/(sici)1099-0992(199609)26:5<799::aid-ejsp796>3.0.co;2-o

Cited by 127 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…These findings were smaller in size and narrower in scope than expected (see Limitations of internal validity from manipulation problems for a discussion) as the consistent effects found in the dissonance theory paradigm (Frey, 1981(Frey, , 1986Ditto & Lopez, 1992;Pinkley, et al, 1995;Frey, et al, 1996;Johnston, 1996;Russo, et al, 1996;Luce, et al, 1997;Lundgren & Prislin, 1998;Schulz-Hardt, et al, 2000;Simon, et al, 2001), despite the parallel situations. This failed to extend dissonance theory paradigm to the Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm.…”

Section: Discussion 181mentioning

confidence: 66%

“…This bias has been replicated in many dissonance theory studies, across a variety of topics, methods and participants. Researchers have explored social stereotypes (Johnston, 1996), attitudes (Lundgren & Prislin, 1998), negotiations (Pinkley, Griffith, & Northcraft, 1995), selfimage (Frey, 1981), expert decision makers (bank managers) (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000), and motivated decision makers (Ditto & Lopez, 1992).…”

Section: Literature Review 23mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Literature Review 32 Platt & Griggs (1993) Wason rule discovery studies Wason (1960); Klayman & Ha (1987); Klayman & Ha (1989); Kareev & Halberstadt (1993) Classification studies Trope & Bassok (1982); Snyder & Swan (1978); Skov & Sherman (1986) Covariation and causation studies Shaklee & Goldston (1989) Smedslund ( Shaklee & Hall (1983) Dissonance theory studies Frey (1981);Frey (1986); Ditto & Lopez (1992);Pinkley, et al (1995);Frey, et al (1996);Johnston (1996);Russo, et al (1996);Luce, et al (1997); Lundgren & Prislin (1998);Schulz-Hardt, et al (2000); Simon, et al (2001) Literature Review 33…”

Section: Literature Review 31mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Confirmation Bias and Related Errors

Borthwick¹

2000

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This study attempted to replicate and extend the study of Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney, and Schiavo (1979), which introduced what is here called the Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm. The present study used this paradigm (and a script similar to that used by Doherty et al.) to explore confirmation bias and related errors that can appear in both search and integration in probability revision. Despite selection differences and weak manipulations, this study provided information relevant to four important questions.First, by asking participants to estimate the values of the conditional probabilities they did not learn, this study was able to examine the use of "intuitive conditionals". This study found evidence that participants used intuitive conditionals and that their intuitive conditionals were affected by the size of the actual conditionals.Second, by examining both phases in the same study, this study became the first to look for inter-phase interactions. A strong correlation was found between the use of focal search strategies and focal integration strategies (r=.81, p<.001).However, when the sample was limited to participants who selected at least one probability conditioned on each hypothesis, the relationship was near random (r=.02).Third, this study was the first in the Bayesian conditionals selection paradigm to provide a basis for selecting information that would be expected to confirm rather than disconfirm the focal hypothesis. No support was found for predictor selection ii bias, but a nearly significant interaction was found between Attention and Motivation (p=.07) in applying Bayes' theorem only to information favoring the focal hypothesis.Fourth, this study was the first to have a single normative posterior probability, against which participants' posterior probability estimates could be compared to yield a quantitative measure of confirmation bias. This permitted measuring the confirmation bias uniquely contributed by each phase, assuming the participant was normative in the other phase. Focused attention was found to increase confirmation bias in the integration phase (p=.03) but not in the search phase.These last three findings challenge the field's assumption that the search and integration phases can be examined separately, and call for reinterpretation of research done on only one phase.

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Section: Discussion 181mentioning

confidence: 66%

Section: Literature Review 23mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Review 31mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Confirmation Bias and Related Errors

Borthwick¹

2000

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“…Hence, if the asymmetric search, per se, does not lead to social expectancy confirmation, it could effectively interact with the following stage, namely, the information encoding stage, where the confirming evidence could carry greater weight than the disconfirming information (e.g., Johnston, 1996). Moreover, the consequence of a particular information search strategy might be affected by the stopping rule; that is, the number of pieces of evidence the information seeker obtains before stopping the search (e.g., Stigler, 1961).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of asymmetric questions on impression formation: A trade-off between evidence diagnosticity and frequency

Sacchi¹,

Rusconi²,

Bonomi³

et al. 2013

PsycEXTRA Dataset

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This is the accepted version of the following article: Sacchi, S., Rusconi, P., Bonomi, M., & Cherubini, P. (2014) When examining social targets, people may ask asymmetric questions, that is, questions for which "yes" and "no" answers are neither equally diagnostic nor equally frequent. The consequences of this information-gathering strategy on impression formation deserve empirical investigation. The present work explored the role played by the trade-off between the diagnosticity and frequency of answers that follow asymmetric questions. In Study 1, participants received answers to symmetric/asymmetric questions on an anonymous social target. In Study 2, participants read answers to a specific symmetric/asymmetric question provided by other group members. Overall, the results of both studies indicate that asymmetric questions had less impact on impressions than did symmetric questions, suggesting that individuals are more sensitive to data frequency than diagnosticity when forming impressions.. Keywords: hypothesis testing, asymmetry, diagnosticity, confirmation bias ASYMMETRY AND IMPRESSION FORMATION 3 Effects of asymmetric questions on impression formation: A trade-off between evidence diagnosticity and frequencyWhen we develop initial impressions of unknown others, we can observe their attitudes and behaviors in their social context or we can ask questions to obtain additional information (e.g., Snyder & Swann, 1978). Despite the ecological relevance of the social hypothesis-testing process, people might be prone to inefficiencies while searching for new evidence that causes them to perceive their prior assumptions (i.e., hypotheses) as more (or less) likely than they actually are (e.g., McKenzie, 2004;Nickerson, 1998;Trope & Liberman, 1996). Such an unwarranted confidence in the hypothesis being tested (i.e., the focal hypothesis) has been termed confirmation bias (e.g., Klayman, 1995;McKenzie, 2004;Nickerson, 1998). Confirmation bias would emerge not only in the way in which people evaluate incoming data but also in the previous stage of the impression-formation process, namely, information gathering, which is when people may seek onesided information that is partial to initial assumptions (Nickerson, 1998).The main purpose of the present study is to investigate the effects of a particular information search strategy, i.e., the asymmetric strategy (Cameron & Trope, 2004;Trope & Thompson, 1997), on impression formation. Gathering information on social targets asymmetrically entails asking queries for which affirmative and negative replies have different effects on judgment and impression formation. Thus, for example, discovering that a person previously spent time in prison easily leads us to think him/her to be dishonest, whereas we do not necessarily judge a person as honest if we know that he/she was never in prison. We aim to analyze the relationship between exposure to answers obtained through asymmetric questions and the tendency to confirm a social hypothesis. More specifically, our interest is in cl...

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“…Lundgren and Prislin 1998 ). These cognitive and affective sources of growing confidence in one's initial beliefs, in turn, may be reinforced by "motivated skepticism," which is to say emotional resistance to counter-arguments (Johnston 1996 ;Zuwerink and Devine 1996 ;Taber and Lodge 2006 ). The net result, in the case of regulators, may be an extra cognitive bias to action, buttressed by standard emotional processes of dogmatization.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Illusion of Regulatory Competence

Tasic

2009

Critical Review

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Resisting change: information-seeking and stereotype change

Cited by 127 publications

References 51 publications

Confirmation Bias and Related Errors

Confirmation Bias and Related Errors

Effects of asymmetric questions on impression formation: A trade-off between evidence diagnosticity and frequency

The Illusion of Regulatory Competence

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