Resilient Routing Layers for Network Disaster Planning

Hansen, Audun Fosselie; Kvalbein, Amund; Cicic, T.; Gjessing, Stein

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-31957-3_125

Cited by 25 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 20 publications

(19 reference statements)

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“…In contrast with these works, we focus on failures within a specific geographical region (e.g., [2], [3], [15]), implying that the failed components do not necessarily share the same physical resource. To the best of our knowledge, geographically correlated failures have been rarely considered [6], [7], [16]- [18] and in most cases, the assumption is that the failures of the components are deterministic.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Network vulnerability to single, multiple, and probabilistic physical attacks

Agarwal

Efrat

Ganjugunte

et al. 2010

2010 - Milcom 2010 Military Communications Conference

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Abstract-Telecommunications networks heavily rely on the physical infrastructure and, are therefore, vulnerable to natural disasters, such as earthquakes or floods, as well as to physical attacks, such as an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack. Largescale disasters are likely to destroy network equipment and to severely affect interdependent systems such as the power-grid. In turn, long-term outage of the power-grid might cause additional failures to the telecommunication network.In this paper, we model an attack as a disk around its epicenter, and provide efficient algorithms to find vulnerable points within the network, under various metrics. In addition, we consider the case in which multiple disasters happen simultaneously and provide an approximation algorithm to find the points which cause the most significant destruction. Finally, since a network element does not always fail, even when it is close to the attack's epicenter, we consider a simple probabilistic model in which the probability of a network element failure is given. Under this model, we tackle the cases of single and multiple attacks and develop algorithms that identify potential points where an attack is likely to cause a significant damage.Index Terms-Network survivability, geographic networks, network design, Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), computational geometry.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Network vulnerability to single, multiple, and probabilistic physical attacks

Agarwal

Efrat

Ganjugunte

et al. 2010

2010 - Milcom 2010 Military Communications Conference

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“…These include studies on its robust yet fragile nature [82,104], vulnerability [86,87,106], survivability [90,91], resilience analysis [74,84,105], reachability [76,94], security and robustness of components [93], fault detection/localization [85,95,98], and the development of resilient routing protocols [75,88,89,102,107]. In contrast to these and similar prior efforts, our study is the first to consider the extensive levels of physical infrastructure sharing in today's Internet, use various metrics to quantify the resulting shared risk and offer viable suggestions for improving the overall robustness of the physical Internet to link and/or router failures.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

InterTubes

Durairajan

Barford

Sommers

et al. 2015

Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Conference on Special Interest Group on Data Communication

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The complexity and enormous costs of installing new longhaul fiber-optic infrastructure has led to a significant amount of infrastructure sharing in previously installed conduits. In this paper, we study the characteristics and implications of infrastructure sharing by analyzing the long-haul fiber-optic network in the US.We start by using fiber maps provided by tier-1 ISPs and major cable providers to construct a map of the long-haul US fiber-optic infrastructure. We also rely on previously underutilized data sources in the form of public records from federal, state, and municipal agencies to improve the fidelity of our map. We quantify the resulting map's 1 connectivity characteristics and confirm a clear correspondence between long-haul fiber-optic, roadway, and railway infrastructures. Next, we examine the prevalence of high-risk links by mapping end-to-end paths resulting from large-scale traceroute campaigns onto our fiber-optic infrastructure map. We show how both risk and latency (i.e., propagation delay) can be reduced by deploying new links along previously unused transportation corridors and rights-of-way. In particular, focusing on a subset of high-risk links is sufficient to improve the overall robustness of the network to failures. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings on issues related to performance, net neutrality, and policy decision-making.

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“…On the contrary, in this paper we focus on events that cause a large number of failures in a specific geographical region (e.g., [6], [14], [25], [28]). To the best of our knowledge, [13] is one of the only papers that considered geographically correlated failures. Yet, it focused on a specific routing solution.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…of every circle that intersects (i, j) and (l, k) at exactly one point each such that these points are distinct} 11: for every (x k , y k ) ∈ L do 12: call evaluateCapacityofCut(x k , y k ) 13 …”

Section: Worst-case Circular Cut -General Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the Vulnerability of the Fiber Infrastructure to Disasters

Neumayer

Zussman

Cohen

et al. 2011

IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking

210

136

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Abstract-Communication networks are vulnerable to natural disasters, such as earthquakes or floods, as well as to physical attacks, such as an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack. Such realworld events happen in specific geographical locations and disrupt specific parts of the network. Therefore, the geographical layout of the network determines the impact of such events on the network's connectivity. In this paper, we focus on assessing the vulnerability of (geographical) networks to such disasters. In particular, we aim to identify the most vulnerable parts of the network. That is, the locations of disasters that would have the maximum disruptive effect on the network in terms of capacity and connectivity. We consider graph models in which nodes and links are geographically located on a plane, and model the disaster event as a line segment or a circular cut. We develop algorithms that find a worstcase line segment cut and a worst-case circular cut. Then, we obtain numerical results for a specific backbone network, thereby demonstrating the applicability of our algorithms to real-world networks. Our novel approach provides a promising new direction for network design to avert geographical disasters or attacks.

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Resilient Routing Layers for Network Disaster Planning

Cited by 25 publications

References 20 publications

Network vulnerability to single, multiple, and probabilistic physical attacks

Network vulnerability to single, multiple, and probabilistic physical attacks

InterTubes

Assessing the Vulnerability of the Fiber Infrastructure to Disasters

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