Resilient power grid state estimation under false data injection attacks

Salehghaffari, Hossein; Khorrami, Farshad

doi:10.1109/isgt.2018.8403396

Cited by 13 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Although the existing research on model-based techniques aiming to develop BDD methods resilient against FDIAs, such methods are typically computationally expensive in terms of processing time and scalability [12]. For example, the authors in [13] deploy distributed flexible AC transmission system devices and activate them stochastically to enhance system hardening against attacks. The reconfiguration of system settings and topology would require recalculation of the power flow.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

CHIMERA: A Hybrid Estimation Approach to Limit the Effects of False Data Injection Attacks

Liu¹,

Hu²,

Konstantinou³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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The reliable operation of the electric power systems is supported by energy management systems (EMS) that provide monitoring and control functionalities. Contingency analysis is a critical application of EMS to evaluate the impacts of outage events based on the grid state variables, and allow system operators to prepare for potential system failures. However, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) against state estimation have demonstrated the possibility of compromising sensor measurements and consequently falsifying the estimated power system states. As a result, FDIAs may mislead the system operations and other EMS applications including contingency analysis and optimal power flow routines. In this paper, we assess the effect of FDIAs on contingency analysis and demonstrate that such attacks can affect the resulted number of contingencies in power systems. In order to mitigate the FDIA impact on contingency analysis algorithms, we propose CHIMERA, a hybrid attackresilient state estimation approach that integrates model-based and data-driven methods. CHIMERA combines the physical grid information with a Long Short Term Memory (LSTM)-based deep learning model by considering a static loss of weighted least square errors and a dynamic loss of the difference between the temporal variations of the actual and the estimated active power. Our simulation experiments based on the load data from New York state demonstrate that CHIMERA can effectively mitigate 91.74% of the attack cases in which FDIAs can maliciously modify the contingency results.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

CHIMERA: A Hybrid Estimation Approach to Limit the Effects of False Data Injection Attacks

Liu¹,

Hu²,

Konstantinou³

et al. 2021

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In [25], multiple least trimmed squares estimations have been used for secure state estimation in power systems. Another effective resilient state estimator has been proposed in [26], where the impacts of perturbations to the impedance of transmission lines in power systems have been analysed. In [27], robust dynamic state estimation (DSE) against spoofing cyber‐attacks has been fulfilled in global positioning systems.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficient resilient dynamic co‐estimation framework for cyber‐physical systems under sensor attacks

Kazemi

Safavi

Setoodeh

2020

IET Control Theory & Appl

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In this study, a novel co‐estimation approach is proposed for dynamic state estimation of cyber‐physical systems (CPSs) subjected to sensor attacks. In the proposed approach, the sensory measurements are preprocessed to extract some valuable information about the launched cyber‐attack. This information is then manipulated to form new state equations, which are augmented with the CPS model. The newly obtained model effectively represents the behaviour of both the CPS states as well as the launched cyber‐attack, and can be used for their co‐estimation. Two structures are suggested for the preprocessing of the sensory measurements that deploy Kalman filter (KF) and two‐step KF for co‐estimation of the states and cyber‐attacks. To effectively handle the concurrent effects of cyber‐attacks and unknown inputs on the CPS co‐estimation process, some auxiliary outputs are generated using high‐gain approximate differentiators to realise the required matching conditions. The proposed dynamic co‐estimation approach improves accuracy via considering the inter‐correlation between the CPS states and the cyber‐attacks. To demonstrate the viability of the proposed co‐estimation method, thorough stability and feasibility analysis are provided. Furthermore, extensive simulations are performed on a well‐known CPS‐the IEEE 14‐bus test system‐ to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

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“…[6] introduces the strong attack regime concept and examines the most damaging attack as the adversary has control over several meter measurements. A novel defense strategy based on applying known perturbation on power grid topology is considered in [13], and the optimal attack and defense strategies are modeled as a zero-sum game. [14] considers the effect of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on communication infrastructures of smart grids, and shows the dynamic performance of load frequency control for a twoarea power system in presence of attacks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hardware-In-The-Loop Vulnerability Analysis of a Single-Machine Infinite-Bus Power System

Salehghaffari

Khodaparastan

2019

2019 IEEE Power &Amp; Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM)

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The dynamic performance of the generators is a critical factor for the safe operation of the power grid. To this extent, the stability of the frequency of generators is the target of cyber attacks since its instability may lead to sizable cascade failures in the whole network. In this paper, we perform the vulnerability analysis in a developed power grid Hardware-In-The-Loop (HITL) testbed with a Wago 750-881 PLC sending control commands to the generators and a 750 Feeder Management Relay connected to a local load. A process-aware coordinated attack is demonstrated by spoofing control commands sent by the PLC and the relay to the simulated power system which is modeled as a single-machine infinite-bus (SMIB). Based on the reachability analysis, the attacker can find the optimal attack signal to drive the system state out of their safe set of values. Thereafter, it is experimentally demonstrated that the attacker does not need to send attack signal continuously if he implements a carefully designed coordinated attack on the PLC and the relay. The presented assessments provide information about the best time to launch an attack in order to destabilize the power system.

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Resilient power grid state estimation under false data injection attacks

Cited by 13 publications

References 11 publications

CHIMERA: A Hybrid Estimation Approach to Limit the Effects of False Data Injection Attacks

CHIMERA: A Hybrid Estimation Approach to Limit the Effects of False Data Injection Attacks

Efficient resilient dynamic co‐estimation framework for cyber‐physical systems under sensor attacks

Hardware-In-The-Loop Vulnerability Analysis of a Single-Machine Infinite-Bus Power System

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