Research on the evolutionary game of environmental pollution in system dynamics model

Abstract

Environmental pollution abatement is a complex project. A system dynamics (SD) model is built for studying a mixed-strategy evolutionary game between the government that manages environmental pollution and the firm that generates contamination during their production processes. The stability analysis and SD simulation results show that evolutionary equilibrium (EE) does not exist with a static penalty. Therefore, a dynamic penalty is suggested in the SD model for equilibrium stabilisation and improvement in environmental pollution. Furthermore, a restraining penalty is found, which can not only stabilise the evolutional processes but also ideally influence the environmental pollution control in the simulation result. The stability analysis of the evolutionary game with both the dynamic penalties proves that Nash equilibrium takes the role of EE. The SD model can connect the static concept with dynamic predictions in the evolutionary game theory in a visual and convenient way.

Evolutionary game analysis and stability control scenarios of coal mine safety inspection system in China based on system dynamics

“…Many research trials have proved that correlating penalties with their unlawful behavior ratio can effectively restrain the fluctuations (Wang et al, 2011;Cai, 2010Cai, , 2011. Therefore, the dynamic penalty control scenario was proposed to restrain the fluctuations, namely, the SACMS make penalties dynamically according to coal enterprises' unlawful production ratio and LRDCMS' dereliction ratio, which were shown in the following formula.…”

For the sustainable performance of the carbon reduction labeling policies under an evolutionary game simulation

“…For instance, Wang et al (2011) used SD to simulate an evolutionary game between the government and enterprises regarding the management of environmental pollution. A dynamic penalty was suggested as an efficient surveillance measure to reduce environmental contamination by enterprises.…”

“…Enterprises are also significant stakeholders in reducing carbon emissions (Wang et al, 2011;Tian et al, 2014). Investigations of the sales of carbon-labeled products have indicated that consumers would like to pay more for green products .…”

CO2 emissions of China's commercial and residential buildings: Evidence and reduction policy

“…The findings have proved the dilemmas in terms of carbon emissions. Some other relevant studies in terms of environmental issues and the revolutionary game theory include Wang et al [9], Barari et al [10], Dai et al [11], Zhu et al [12], Wang et al [13]. Even in other empirical studies with different methods such as Bao et al [14], Guo and Wang [15], Chen [16], Cao [17].…”