Research on Investment and Financing Evolution Game of Supply Chain under the Intervention of the Logistics Platform

Abstract

This paper constructs an evolutionary game model of ‘financing enterprise-investor-platform’ and analyses the stability of the choice of multi-agent income strategy based on the logistics platform application scenario. In this paper, we discuss the effects of multidimensional factors, such as platform commission rate, platform reputation premium, loan interest rate, unit logistics cost and product price on the choice of multi-agent income strategy. Then, we study the stable strategy combination of a multi-agent evolutionary game, and the constraints formed by the combination of agent stability strategies are obtained. Finally, the research conclusions are verified through numerical simulation analysis. The research shows that the commission rate and logistics price of the logistics finance platform should be set within a reasonable range. When the logistics finance platform has a high expectation of reputation premium, it will be conducive to promoting financing enterprises and investors to adopt positive strategies to achieve win-win cooperation. The investor implements the credit strategy according to the principle of maximising its income and dominates the selection of enterprise financing strategy. The higher financing willingness of financing enterprises is conducive to promoting the implementation of credit easing strategy by the investor, ultimately achieving the optimal income of the three agents. However, the stable state of investor-enterprise cooperation depends on the platform to actively promote the establishment of a good trust mechanism.