Research on Detection Technology of Spoofing under the Mixed Narrowband and Spoofing Interference

Abstract

The global navigation satellite system has achieved great success in the civil and military fields and is an important resource for space-time information services. However, spoof interference has always been one of the main threats to the application security of satellite navigation receivers. In order to further improve the application security of satellite navigation receivers, this paper focuses on the application scenarios where narrowband and spoofing interference exist at the same time, studies the problem of spoofing interference detection under mixed interference conditions, then proposes a spoofing interference detection method based on the tracking loop identification curve. This method can effectively deal with the detection of spoofing interference under the conditions of narrowband interference and, at the same time, it can effectively detect the spoofing interference of gradual deviation. Simulation experiments verify the effectiveness of the spoofing interference detection method, based on the tracking loop discrimination curve. In typical jamming and spoofing scenarios, when the spoofing signal is about 7.5 m away from the real signal, the method used in this paper can achieve effective detection. The proposed detection method is of great significance for improving the anti-spoofing capability of satellite navigation receivers.

Defensive Performance Evaluation Methods of the GNSS for Satellite Navigation Countermeasures

“…② For GNSS deceptive jamming, when the obtained RMSE(s) does not exceed 0.50 m [4] and the obtained MAD(ρ) does not exceed 10 m [8], a spoofing is considered as success, shown in Eq. ( 6); and then, if the gdj tests are successful in the n tests, we can determine the deceptive success rate ωdj as Eq.…”

“…As the performance of the signal acquisition, carrier tracking, and data demodulation of this type of receiver is related to the SINR of each correlator, in the full digital simulation, we can build the evaluation model of the SINR in Eq. (8)…”

“…There have been many studies on performance evaluation of certain technologies in GNSS defensive capabilities during countering recently: ① For a performance index system, Kim et al designed performance indices for satellite reconnaissance [6]; however, this index system included many qualitative indices, no further quantitative methods and judging methods are given which resulted in low availability. Heng et al and Huang et al respectively built performance index systems for evaluating GNSS suppressive jamming [7] and deceptive jamming [8] effectiveness; Gao et al and Ni et al designed performance indices for GNSS anti-jamming technologies including vector tracking [9], inertial navigation system (INS) aiding, and spatial filtering combined with temporal filtering [10]; however, the involved indices were one-sided, the obtained results could only meet the needs of designers for perfecting equipment and enhancing performance, but could not meet the decision-making need for expanding the defensive benefit of the GNSS during countering. ② For the performance evaluation, Ceccato et al evaluated the effect of GNSS deceptive jamming [11]; then, Psiaki et al took a GPS receiver as an example, and further demonstrated the impact of GNSS spoofing effect on its positioning performance [12]; however, since detection methods of corresponding indicators mentioned were not totally established and only performance test results were given, there wase no way to adjust the model of the evaluation method according to the performance results.…”

Overview of Jamming Technology for Satellite Navigation

“…The signal frequency bandwidth of narrowband jamming is generally far less than the target signal frequency bandwidth, and the autocorrelation is good. Although the target satellite navigation signal cannot be completely submerged, the energy is relatively concentrated, and the power spectral density is large, which can saturate or even overflow the navigation receiver channel; The signal frequency bandwidth of broadband jamming is generally equal to the target signal frequency bandwidth, and the spectrum amplitude is relatively flat, which can effectively partially or completely submerge the satellite signal, resulting in the navigation receiver being unable to capture the target satellite navigation signal and reducing the positioning efficiency of the navigation receiver [25,26].…”

GNSS Spoofing Detection Using Q Channel Energy

“…Another category of defense techniques focuses on characteristic quantities in the signal processing and the navigation solution process. This includes factors such as the number of correlation peaks [12], received signal power [13,14], carrier-to-noise ratio (CNR) [15], correlator output distribution [16,17], ephemeris data and pseudo-range differences [18]. These methods have been verified against the simplistic spoofing design and part scenarios of the intermediate spoofing.…”