Rescuing the Libertarian Non-Aggression Principle

Abstract

Many libertarians ground their theory of justice in anon-aggression principle(NAP). The NAP is often the basis for the libertarian condemnation of state action – that it is necessarily aggressive and therefore unjust. This approach is often criticised insofar as it defines aggression, in part, as the violation of legitimate property rights, and is therefore parasitical upon a prior – and unjustified – theory of property. While it is true that libertarians who defend the NAP sometimes fail to give a satisfactory account of its relationship to libertarian property rights, such an account is in fact available. A commitment to property rights and to non-aggression can both be grounded in a commitment tonon-interference. Such a principle, then, brings together the NAP and the theory of property it is parasitical upon, thus saving the unity and austerity of the overall approach.

Reciprocal libertarianism

“…I owe the suggestion of this possible reconciliation of self-ownership with reciprocity to an anonymous reviewer. This is relevant also for Christmas (2018Christmas ( , 2021 and Long (2006). Indeed, see Christmas (2020Christmas ( , 2021) and Long (1998) for how libertarianism can ground forms of collective and public ownership.…”

“… 21. I owe the suggestion of this possible reconciliation of self-ownership with reciprocity to an anonymous reviewer. This is relevant also for Christmas (2018, 2021) and Long (2006). Indeed, see Christmas (2020, 2021: chap.…”

Against Kantian Statism

“…7;Wheeler 1980;Fressola 1981;Mack 1990;Steiner 1994, ch. 7;van der Vossen 2009;Christmas 2017;2019b;Brennan & van der Vossen 2018). The other account regards acquired property rights as normatively posterior to the state's legitimate authority; as a servant to macro level political values.…”